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DAVE FAGUNDES* & AARON PERZANOWSKI**
ABSTRACT
For nearly two hundred years, U.S. copyright law has assumed
that owners may voluntarily abandon their rights in a work. But
scholars have largely ignored copyright abandonment, and case law
on the subject is fragmented and inconsistent. As a result, abandon-
ment remains poorly theorized, owners can avail themselves of no
reliable mechanism to abandon their works, and the practice
remains rare. This Article seeks to bring copyright abandonment out
of the shadows, showing that it is a doctrine rich in conceptual,
normative, and practical significance. Unlike abandonment of real
and chattel property, which imposes significant public costs in
exchange for discrete private benefits, copyright abandonment is
potentially costly for rights holders but broadly beneficial for society.
Nonetheless, rights holders—ranging from lauded filmmakers and
photographers to leading museums and everyday creators—make
the counterintuitive choice to abandon valuable works. This Article
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analyzes two previously untapped resources to better understand
copyright abandonment. First, we survey four decades of U.S.
Copyright Office records, exposing both the motivations for abandon-
ment and the infrequency of the practice. Second, we examine every
state and federal copyright abandonment case, a corpus of nearly
three hundred decisions. By distilling this body of law, this Article
distinguishes abandonment from a set of related doctrines and
reveals the major fault lines in judicial application of the abandon-
ment standard. Finally, we highlight the potential of abandonment
to further copyright’s constitutional aims by suggesting a series of
reforms designed to better align copyright holder incentives with the
public good.
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INTRODUCTION
Copyright vests automatically, whether authors want it or not.
The author of an original work is a copyright holder from the
instant that work is fixed in some durable form.1 But what if you do
not want to own a copyright in the photo you just took or the song
you just wrote?2 Or what if, for reasons of personal gain or pure
altruism, you want to abandon your existing copyright and place
your work in the public domain?
In theory, copyright owners, like owners of chattel property, may
abandon their works.3 In fact, copyright law borrowed its legal test
for abandonment from common law property doctrine.4 In practice,
though, it remains far from clear how an author can actually
relinquish rights in a work. The Copyright Act makes no mention of
abandonment, and there is no standard form to file with the Copy-
right Office.5 In light of this, courts have been understandably
conflicted about what acts reflect an intent to abandon.6 And even
if the law did offer a clear pathway for authors to abandon their
copyrights, there is no single, definitive registry of abandoned works
for would-be users to consult.7
1. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102(a).
2. Aside from works created by the federal government or those that fail copyright’s
minimal eligibility standards, there is no mechanism under current U.S. law to prevent
copyright from vesting as an initial matter. See id. § 105.
3. We focus here on U.S. copyright law. There is considerable variation among juris-
dictions on the question of copyright abandonment. Under United Kingdom law, the avail-
ability of abandonment is far from clear, and statements purporting to abandon copyright may
be interpreted as mere revocable licenses. See Phillip Johnson, ‘Dedicating’ Copyright to the
Public Domain, 71 MOD. L. REV. 587, 596-98 (2008). German courts have rejected the idea of
abandonment. GRAHAM GREENLEAF & DAVID LINDSAY, PUBLIC RIGHTS: COPYRIGHT’S PUBLIC
DOMAINS 512 (2018) (citing Bundesgerichts of [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 23, 1995,
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 673 (Ger.)). Other jurisdic-
tions—Chile, Colombia, India, and Kenya among them—expressly recognize abandonment.
See Andres Guadamuz, Comparative Analysis of National Approaches on Voluntary Copyright
Relinquishment, at 14, 21, World Intell. Prop. Org. Report CDIP/13/INF/10 (Apr. 14, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446451 [https://perma.cc/6LSZ-M4RS].
4. See infra Part I.A (explaining the common law abandonment doctrine as it pertains
to chattels).
5. See infra Part III.A (stating that the 1976 Copyright Act took out formal requirements
for abandonment).
6. See infra Part III.C.2.
7. Cf. Robert P. Merges, To Waive and Waive Not: Property and Flexibility in the Digital
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The uncertainty surrounding these elementary questions of
copyright ownership is problematic, in part, because it frustrates
abandonment’s potential to enrich the increasingly starved public
domain. Copyright’s constitutional lodestar—promoting the progress
of science—presumes a healthy balance between privately owned
works and publicly available material.8 But after decades of
unremittingly copyright-holder-friendly reforms, this balance has
tipped significantly toward private rights at the expense of the
public.9 Legislation extending the term of copyright and eliminating
formal requirements for protection has slowed to a trickle the flow
of works into the public domain.10 In light of these trends, an
invigorated abandonment doctrine promises a voluntary means to
replenish the desiccated public domain well before statutory ex-
piration of copyright.
The desire among authors to part with their copyrights in order
to enrich the public domain is not merely theoretical. Rights holders
have attempted to abandon their rights in millions of photos, in-
cluding hundreds of thousands from the Metropolitan Museum of
Art alone.11 Acclaimed photographer Carol Highsmith sought to
abandon her rights in tens of thousands of images donated to the
Library of Congress.12 Likewise, award-winning filmmaker Nina
Paley expressed her desire to place her film, Sita Sings the Blues,
in the public domain.13 And more than one hundred thousand soft-
ware projects hosted on GitHub indicate the developers’ intention
to abandon copyright.14 Other times, abandonment arises as a
Era, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 113, 130 (2011) (reflecting on the surprising difficulty of
abandoning copyrights).
8. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 152-68 and accompanying text (tracing several recent pieces of
legislation that make copyright more protective of private rights).
10. See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
11. See Dave Fagundes & Aaron Perzanowski, It’s Too Hard to Put Artwork into the Public
Domain, VICE (Mar. 16, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qjdnmp/ its-too-
hard-to-put-artwork-into-the-public-domain [https://perma.cc/HE6M-XQWD].
12. Id.
13. Sara Benson, Nina Paley No Longer Sings the Copyright Blues, COPYRIGHT CHAT
(Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.library.illinois.edu/scp/podcast/nina-paley-no-longer-sings-the-
copyright-blues/ [https://perma.cc/D2EU-9P6L].
14. Ben Balter, Open Source License Usage on GitHub.com, GITHUB BLOG (Mar. 9, 2015),
https://github.blog/2015-03-09-open-source-license-usage-on-github-com/ [https://perma.cc/
BHS7-2QSN].
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defense, as when InfoWars claimed it did not infringe Matt Furie’s
“Pepe the Frog” because Furie’s public statements indicated that
he had abandoned the character.15 Given the state of the law, how-
ever, whether these owners have actually abandoned their copy-
rights remains unclear.16
The disarray pervading the law and practice of copyright
abandonment has not inspired much scholarly examination.17 This
is unsurprising. Until the pioneering work of Eduardo Peñalver and
Lior Strahilevitz, abandonment of physical property received little
attention from scholars either. Yet Peñalver and Strahilevitz
showed that, despite the dearth of attention paid to the topic,
abandonment of physical property is a rich topic worthy of careful
scrutiny.18
Similarly, this Article seeks to illuminate the largely ignored law
and policy of copyright abandonment. We make the case that, just
as with physical property, copyright abandonment is a question of
practical and theoretical significance that deserves greater atten-
tion. The very notion of abandoning copyright is fraught with con-
ceptual difficulty. The leading theory of abandonment—unilateral
transfer—is an admittedly poor fit for copyright since abandonment
results in a public good rather than a resource that can be claimed
by a particular owner.19 Moreover, the thing protected by copy-
right—the work of authorship—is an abstraction, rather than a
15. Eriq Gardner, InfoWars Pays $15K to Settle ‘Pepe the Frog’ Copyright Lawsuit,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 10, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/infowars-pays-15k-settle-pepe-frog-copyright-lawsuit-1217193 [https://perma.cc/HNG8-
YYPN]. InfoWars eventually paid $15,000 to settle the suit as a jury trial loomed, suggesting
that InfoWars’s abandonment argument may not have been that compelling. See id.
16. See infra Part III.C.2 (overviewing the lack of clarity in the law surrounding
abandonment).
17. See, e.g., Timothy K. Armstrong, Shrinking the Commons: Termination of Copyright
Licenses and Transfers for the Benefit of the Public, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 359, 364 (2010);
Tom W. Bell, Escape from Copyright: Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection
of Expressive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 741 (2001); Johnson, supra note 3, at 587; Lydia
Pallas Loren, Abandoning the Orphans: An Open Access Approach to Hostage Works, 27
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1431, 1433 (2012) [hereinafter Loren, Abandoning the Orphans]; Lydia
Pallas Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons of Creative Works: Enforcement of Creative
Commons Licenses and Limited Abandonment of Copyright, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 271, 271-
73 (2007) [hereinafter Loren, Building a Reliable Semicommons].
18. See generally Eduardo M. Peñalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV.
191 (2010); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355 (2010).
19. See infra Part I.B.
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corporeal object.20 So while one can conceive of easy ways to aban-
don a chattel—putting your old TV on the curb with a sign reading
“free,” for example—expressing your intention to abandon rights in
a work of authorship presents a much thornier challenge. Further,
it is easy to imagine reasons that owners may want to abandon
physical property: old furniture takes up space, a boat requires
upkeep, and there is perhaps peace to be found in purging clutter.21
But copyrights take up no space and cost nothing to maintain,22 so
it seems counterintuitive that authors would ever give up rights in
a work. That said, the fact remains that owners do express the
desire to give up rights in their works with no pecuniary reward in
mind, however much this may frustrate the predictions of rational
choice economics.23
Copyright abandonment also presents a distinctive doctrinal
tangle. Black letter law outlines the same basic test for relinquish-
ing rights in a work as it does for chattels: intent to abandon, plus
some overt act evidencing that intent.24 While there were legal
mechanisms for abandoning a copyright under prior regimes, the
Copyright Act of 1976 jettisoned those formal requirements, leaving
owners without any clear pathway to place their work in the public
domain.25 Courts have, however, continued to apply the common law
abandonment doctrine under the post-1976 Act regime, albeit with
conflicting results that fail to give authors clarity as to what acts are
sufficient to inject their works into the public domain.26
As a result, the law frustrates otherwise aligned individual and
social preferences. Many copyright owners would like to abandon
their works, including some high-value ones.27 Abandonment of such
works would advance copyright’s constitutional goals by enriching
the public domain.28 Yet copyright law itself remains a stumbling
20. See infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
21. See generally MARIE KONDO, THE LIFE-CHANGING MAGIC OF TIDYING UP 7, 17 (2014);
MARGARETA MAGNUSSON, THE GENTLE ART OF SWEDISH DEATH CLEANING 6 (2018).
22. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (giving examples of creators
abandoning copyright with no pecuniary reward in mind).
24. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
25. See infra Part III.A.
26. See infra Part III.C.2.
27. See infra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
28. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress
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block because of the muddled doctrinal and administrative structure
of abandonment.29
This Article seeks to resolve this tension between the revealed
preferences of creators and the constitutional goals of copyright law,
on the one hand, and the interpretation and application of the law,
on the other. It explores the theoretical and doctrinal terrain of
copyright abandonment in order to outline reforms that could help
abandonment serve copyright law’s constitutional aims. It does so
in four Parts.
Part I briefly outlines the conceptual foundations of abandonment
in the contexts of both physical property and copyright. In Part II,
we turn to the welfare effects of abandonment, contrasting the cost-
benefit dynamic in physical property—characterized by high private
benefit but high social costs—to that of copyright—marked by low
private benefit and high social benefit. Despite this reversal in the
cost-benefit calculus, we demonstrate that rights holders nonethe-
less seek to abandon their works for a variety of reasons.
As Part III details, however, even for copyright holders who prefer
to abandon their works, the legal framework for doing so remains
unhelpfully opaque. This analysis is based on our exhaustive
examination of two previously unappreciated datasets. First, we
collected and reviewed notices of abandonment filed with the
Copyright Office over the last forty years. Second, we evaluated
nearly three hundred judicial decisions, dating back to the early
nineteenth century, that analyzed copyright abandonment. Our
analysis establishes a number of descriptive claims about copyright
abandonment, primarily that neither statutory, administrative, nor
judicial copyright law provides a particularly clear path for those
seeking to abandon their works, or for those hoping to mine the
public domain. Finally, we outline a number of potential reforms to
facilitate and optimize abandonment in Part IV.
I. CONCEPTUALIZING ABANDONMENT
Abandonment, as a legal concept, remains poorly understood.
Although Strahilevitz and Peñalver made important inroads with
of Science and useful Arts” through copyright).
29. See infra Parts III.B, III.C.2.
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respect to chattel abandonment, no similar work has investigated
the fundamental nature of copyright abandonment.30 We begin by
first exploring how the doctrine works in the context of physical
property. We then consider how the existing accounts of abandon-
ment track onto copyright. In so doing, we offer a theory of abandon-
ment that rejects the leading notion of abandonment as unilateral
transfer31 in favor of one that instead models abandonment as the
owner’s relinquishment of a legal relationship with their property.
A. Abandoning Property
The familiar constituent rights of property owners—use, exclu-
sion, and transfer—do not include the right to abandon. Yet there
is an intuitive sense that if an owner does not want to continue
owning something, it would be strange for law to prevent her from
doing so.32 As J.E. Penner observed, “[A]n unbreakable relation to
a thing would condemn the owner to having to deal with it. It would
indeed be a funny turn of events if ... property in essence gave the
things a person owned a power over him.”33 Penner’s observation is
rooted in a conception of property committed to individual auton-
omy.34 If ownership is an institution that both embodies and
protects individual liberty, then owners need the right to abandon,
or else property may burden owners more than it frees them.35
The common law tradition creates a limited right to abandon
personal property pursuant to a two-part test. An owner who wishes
to abandon their chattel may do so if they form the subjective intent
to relinquish it and also engage in some overt act reflecting that
intent.36 If you want to get rid of your old couch, for example, merely
30. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 587.
31. See Peñalver, supra note 18, at 198 (describing abandonment as “a unilateral act”).
32. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 485 (2d
ed. 2012) (“Owner sovereignty is ... commonly thought to include the right to abandon
property (throw it away or relinquish all claim to title).”).
33. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 79 (1997).
34. Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 381-82 (discussing Penner’s notion of abandonment as
rooted in a vision of property as a site of individual autonomy).
35. See infra Part IV (outlining issues copyright owners face without the ability to
abandon).
36. Ritz v. Selma United Methodist Church, 467 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Iowa 1991); JOHN G.
SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW § 4.03[B][1] (4th ed. 2017) (“Property is
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wishing it gone from your living room is not enough. You would
need to also engage in some act that a reasonable person would
understand as indicating a desire to abandon.37 This may mean
placing the couch on the curb on bulk item trash day or in your front
yard with a sign reading “free.”38 At that point, abandonment is
complete; the thing ceases to belong to the owner.39 Some forms of
property, like your unwanted couch, are treated as res derelictae—
cast-off resources, free for others to claim as their own exclusive
property.40 Others, like copyrighted works, become res communes—
shared public resources, free for all to use.41
Recent work on abandonment characterizes it as a unilateral
transfer.42 This definition at first blush seems oxymoronic. The
nature of transfer is bilateral: sales involve a seller and a buyer;
gifts involve a donor and a donee.43 While we critique this account
below, unilaterality is essential to abandonment. It is different from
other forms of alienation precisely because it is a one-sided cession
of property rights.44 The abandoning owner gives up their legal re-
lationship to the thing, but the identity of the subsequent owner—
abandoned when the owner (a) intends to relinquish all right, title, and interest in it, but not
transfer title to any particular person, and (b) takes action that manifests this intent.”).
37. See SPRANKLING, supra note 36.
38. This turns in part on the prevailing norms within the community. In most cities, items
unattended on the sidewalk communicate that they are free for taking. A couch placed outside
in a college town, however, may not communicate the same message. See, e.g., Paul Parker,
The Couches of Kirksville, TRUMAN FAC.WEBSITE, http://parker.sites.truman.edu/the-couches-
of-kirksville [https://perma.cc/DXN6-A8W7].
39. See Ritz, 467 N.W.2d at 269 (explaining that a finder of abandoned property “acquires
absolute title as against the former owner”).
40. Lauren Benton & Benjamin Straumann, Acquiring Empire by Law: From Roman
Doctrine to Early Modern European Practice, 28 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 15 (2010); see, e.g., Haslem
v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500, 506-07 (1871). The act of abandonment creates a race to determine
subsequent ownership via first possession. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 177-78 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1805).
41. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896) (referring to res communes as “those
things which were common to all [and] belonged no more to one than to the others”); Carol M.
Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the
Information Age, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 93-95 (2003).
42. Peñalver, supra note 18, at 198 (“What distinguishes abandonment as a legal concept
... is that it is a purely unilateral act.”); Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 360.
43. Transfer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “transfer” as “[a]
conveyance of property or title from one person to another”).
44. Peñalver, supra note 18, at 198.
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if in fact there ever is one—is not known and is unrelated to the
abandoning owner’s relinquishment of their rights.45
This abstract account of abandonment, though, becomes more
complicated in practice. Permitting unfettered abandonment would
impose widespread social costs because unwanted property is likely
to have low or even negative value.46 Placing your garbage on the
curb for pickup complies with local ordinances and does not create
an eyesore or a smelly mess for the neighborhood. But placing your
old couch in a public park may be less an act of generosity than an
attempt to rid yourself of an unwanted and bulky item taking up too
much space in your home.
Law, thus, places a number of constraints on owners who want to
abandon their things. Most importantly, abandonment is available
at common law only for chattels, not for real property.47 Abandoning
land can create particularly significant social costs. When under-
water owners walked away from homes en masse during the Great
Recession, the result was vandalism, squatting, and decay, all of
which drove down property values and accelerated economic
decline.48 And without an owner of record, the state cannot levy and
collect taxes on real property.49
45. Id. (stating that abandonment “does not depend on the consent of any third party for
its completion”).
46. See Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 372-75 (enumerating the social costs of
abandonment). Even Penner acknowledges that the individual’s autonomy interest in
abandonment must be balanced against nonowners’ autonomy interest in not having the costs
of owners’ abandonment thrust upon them without consent. PENNER, supra note 33, at 79
(“[W]hile the interest underpinning property incorporates the interest in getting rid of things
one no longer wants, people also have an interest in not being harmed by the way that people
deal with their things.”).
47. Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233, 236 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995);
SPRANKLING, supra note 36, § 4.03[B][1], at 38 n.9 (“[T]he abandonment doctrine only applies
to personal property; real property cannot be abandoned.” (citing Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n,
667 A.2d at 233)).
48. See Richard Florida, Vacancy: America's Other Housing Crisis, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB
(July 27, 2018, 2:30 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/07/vacancy-americas-other-
housing-crisis/565901/ [https://perma.cc/P5K9-CBEA]; U.S.CONF. OF MAYORS,IMPACT OF THE




49. Cf. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 32, at 489 (tracing the prohibition on abandonment
of real property to “the incidents and services that landowners were supposed to perform in
feudal England, which meant that there could be no gap in the ‘seisin’ of real property”).
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While black letter law allows owners to abandon chattel property,
this prerogative is subject to a number of legal and practical limits.
Local laws designed to prevent owners from externalizing disposal
costs often override the common law freedom to abandon.50 Trash
may be disposed of only on certain days in certain places. In most
cities, you would be subject to a municipal citation for dumping your
old fax machine on a park bench. Because Floridians tend to let
their boats float away, either because they grow bored of the salt life
or because the watercraft has proven too expensive to maintain,
their state passed a law that required watercraft owners to sell their
boats or bear the ownership costs.51 In light of this, Peñalver argues
that abandonment is much more difficult than the common law rule
lets on.52 Given the likelihood of municipal fines and the risk of
trespass, he regards the right to abandon personalty as “illusory.”53
The black letter law of abandonment is thus clear in theory but
muddled in practice. Owners have a theoretical right to abandon,
but a series of limits cabin their ability to do so. These limits derive
from reasonable concerns about the social costs of abandoning
property.54 But how do the law and policy of abandonment change
when we move from physical property to copyrights?
B. Abandoning Copyrights
Courts have long articulated the same common law standard for
abandonment of copyrights that applies to corporeal things.55 If an
owner wants to unilaterally dispossess themself of a copyright, they
must form an intent to do so and engage in some overt act reflecting
50. See, e.g., Peñalver, supra note 18, at 204.
51. State law empowers the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission to collect
derelict boats and order their owners to reclaim them within five days. See FLA.STAT. § 823.11
(2019); Peñalver, supra note 18, at 204-05 (“The [Floridian boat] owner cannot disclaim
responsibility by saying she has abandoned the boat and that it is, as a result, no longer her
concern.”). Owners who fail to do so are subject to criminal fines and removal costs. See
§ 823.11(3), (5).
52. Peñalver, supra note 18, at 203-08.
53. Id. at 194 (“Viewing the law concerning the right to abandon as a unitary legal
structure ... reveals that the owner’s right to abandon (even chattels) is largely illusory.”).
54. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
55. For a full discussion of the history and contemporary status of copyright abandonment
case law, see infra Part III.
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that intent.56 The consequences of abandonment, though, are quite
different in the copyright context. Abandoned physical things are up
for grabs until another owner claims them. By contrast, abandoned
copyrighted works instantly become part of the public domain,
available for use by anyone, not just by the first user to stake a
claim.57
Strahilevitz concludes that, since copyright interests cannot be
subsequently reacquired by private owners, copyright abandonment
is not abandonment at all.58 “Copyright ‘abandonment’ is therefore
in some sense an inapt phrase,” he writes.59 “There is no ‘roll’ of the
dice following the abandonment of a copyright—ownership of an
abandoned copyrighted work is necessarily public.”60
56. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.06 (Matthew
Bender, rev. ed. 2020) (1963) (ebook) (“Abandonment occurs only if there is an intent by the
copyright proprietor to surrender rights in his work. There is, moreover, strong authority
holding that an overt act evidencing such intent is necessary to establish abandonment.”); see
Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding
that an owner may abandon a copyright, but “must ‘abandon’ it by some overt act which
manifests his purpose to surrender his rights in the ‘work’ and to allow the public to copy it”).
57. See Nat’l Comics, 191 F.2d at 598. U.S. trademark law explicitly allows for
abandonment. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (noting that a mark is abandoned if it becomes generic or “its
use has been discontinued with intent not to resume,” which may be inferred after three
consecutive years of nonuse). In contrast to copyrights, abandoned trademarks become
available for others to adopt and establish exclusivity over. See George & Co. v. Imagination
Ent. Ltd., 575 F.3d 383, 400 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Once abandoned, a mark returns to the public
domain.”); Manhattan Indus., Inc. v. Sweater Bee by Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 629-30 (2d Cir.
1980) (“Upon the mark's abandonment, a free-for-all ensued.... [The parties] ‘were equally free
to attempt to capture the mark to their own use.’” (citing Sutton Cosmetics (P.R.) Inc. v.
Lander Co., Inc., 455 F.2d 285, 288 (2d Cir. 1972))). But see Jorge L. Contreras, Sui-
Genericide, 106 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 7), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3392043 [https://perma.cc/7PCP-XC2U] (arguing that if a trade-
mark owner abandons its mark by causing it to become a generic term, that mark effectively
enters the public domain). Camilla Hrdy and Mark Lemley argue that abandoned trade
secrets, like most trademarks, can be claimed by new owners. See Camilla A. Hrdy & Mark
A. Lemley, Abandoning Trade Secrets, 73 STAN.L.REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2),
https://papers.ssrn.com/so63/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3534322 [https://perma.cc/5XXQ-YSKU].
In light of the novelty requirement, abandoned patents—like copyrights—remain in the public
domain. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b)(2) (noting that a “patent shall expire” if maintenance fees are
not paid within a six-month grace period).
58. Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 391-92.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 392. Peñalver does not consider copyright abandonment, but his understanding
of it would apply equally to copyrights and physical chattel property. He defines the essence
of abandonment as the “intent to sever one’s ties of ownership, not an intent to convey the
property to a particular person.” Peñalver, supra note 18, at 197. Courts have also tended to
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We recognize that copyright and physical property abandonment
are distinct in this respect but are not convinced that this means
that there is no true abandonment of copyrights. For one thing,
copyright and physical property abandonment are more alike than
different. They are both voluntary relinquishments of ownership
rights.61 They both cause the abandoned thing to be available for
anyone to use.62 Strahilevitz stresses that abandoned copyrights are
not “up for grabs” in the sense that abandoned physical property is
because they cannot be claimed as private property by the next
possessor.63 Yet abandoned copyrights are in a sense more “up for
grabs” than abandoned corporeal things because their public domain
status makes them permanently available for anyone to use.64
Moreover, the identity of the eventual owner of abandoned
property is less important than the intent and conduct of the
abandoning owner. Even accepting arguendo the characterization
of abandonment as a unilateral transfer, it is effective upon the
owner’s completion of whatever acts are necessary to perfect cession
of their rights, regardless of the eventual disposition of the
property.65 In the case of both physical chattels and copyrights, the
owner forms the intent to give up their rights and then manifests
that intent.66 The post hoc effect of that decision does not change the
owner’s intent or its manifestation, so it is irrelevant to whether the
define abandonment without insisting on a requirement that the abandoned good be made
susceptible of future private ownership. See, e.g., Campbell v. Cochran, 416 A.2d 211, 221
(Del. Super. Ct. 1980) (defining abandoned property as “that to which the owner has
voluntarily relinquished all right, title, claim and possession, with the intention of
terminating his ownership, but without vesting ownership in any other person, and with the
intention of not reclaiming any future rights therein”).
61. Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 376.
62. See id. at 391-92.
63. Id. at 360-61, 392.
64. In other jurisdictions, abandonment results in cession to the public. Civil law regimes,
such as Poland and France, permit owners to relinquish their rights in real property, at which
point it becomes public land, owned and administered by the state. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.][CIVIL
CODE] art. 713 (Fr.); Kodeks cywilny [Civil Code] Apr. 23, 1964, art. 180 (Pol.). Brazil holds
abandoned land as vacant property whose title passes to the state after ten years. CÓDIGO
CIVIL [C.C.] [CIVIL CODE] arts. 1275-76 (Braz.). Strahilevitz does acknowledge these regimes,
and stresses that they amount to “abandonment in the colloquial sense,” though they “do not
satisfy [his] narrow definition of abandonment.” Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 394-95.
65. Cf. Peñalver, supra note 18, at 198 (observing that abandonment “does not depend on
the consent of any third party for its completion”).
66. See Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 375-76.
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law recognizes an abandonment. To illustrate the point, if you
formed an intent to abandon your fax machine and left it on a park
bench with a sign saying “free,” and then no one took it, it would
remain on the bench as res derelictae. But the fact that no one chose
to take possession of the fax machine would not mean that I had not
abandoned it.
In light of this, abandonment is not best understood as a trans-
fer at all. The major flaw of the unilateral transfer theory is that it
fails to capture the all-too-common situation in which the original
owner severs any legal right to the property, but no one claims the
abandoned object.67 As Peñalver concedes, even in the absence of
a claimant of the res derelictae, abandonment has occurred.68 Not
surprisingly then, characterizing abandonment as unilateral trans-
fer clashes with our intuitions—and the law’s definitions—of trans-
fer as an act defined by bilaterality. As Blackstone understood,
transfer is “the passing of a thing or of property from one person to
another.”69
For copyright in particular, understanding abandonment as a
transfer seems particularly implausible. For one thing, valid trans-
fers under the Copyright Act require a signed, written agreement.70
But when courts evaluate claims of abandonment, they make no ef-
fort to ensure compliance with that statutory requirement,71 sug-
gesting that they do not regard abandonment as subject to copyright
law’s transfer rules.72
For these reasons, we argue that transfer is not the best concep-
tual model for abandonment. Rather, abandonment should be
understood as the relinquishment of a property right.73 In contrast
67. See Peñalver, supra note 18, at 203-06.
68. See id. (discussing examples of how abandonment can occur de facto even though the
formal common law rule of abandonment is largely illusory).
69. See Transfer, BLACK’SLAWDICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910) (quoting 2 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *294).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a).
71. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
72. Copyright’s statutory definition of “transfer” makes no reference to abandonment. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (defining “transfer”).
73. See Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 360. Here, we understand “relinquishment” to mean
the unilateral relinquishment of ownership. Id. In a different sense, voluntary transfers such
as sales or gifts result in the relinquishment of the transferor’s rights, but those are obviously
not instances of abandonment. See id. at 360 n.11.
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to a transfer, abandonment entails relinquishment of property
rights by the owner without those rights vesting in another person.74
This avoids the conceptual contradiction of characterizing un-
claimed property as having been transferred to a party who may
never materialize.75 Unlike the transfer theory, this model captures
both abandonment that results in res derelictae as well as res
communes, giving this account more explanatory leverage.76 In
either case, the owner, through acts that manifest their intent, has
voluntarily relinquished their rights in the thing they once owned.77
Moreover, our theory comports better with intuitions about the
essence of abandonment, because it focuses on the owner’s choice
to sever a legal relationship.78 Indeed, this is how Black’s Law Dic-
tionary defines abandonment: “relinquishing of a right or interest
with the intention of never reclaiming it.”79
One important consequence for copyright law flows from the
recognition of abandonment as a relinquishment or elimination of
legal rights rather than a transfer of them. The Copyright Act
permits authors and their heirs to terminate copyright transfers
and licenses that were executed decades prior.80 These provisions
are designed to give authors an opportunity to renegotiate unfavor-
able contract terms or regain control over commercially valuable
works.81 To the extent abandonment is understood as a transfer to
the public, the termination provisions might suggest that the
author’s estate could undo that choice decades later, significantly
disrupting expectations about the durability of the public domain.82
But once we understand abandonment as the relinquishment of
74. See id. at 376.
75. See id. at 360 n.11 (describing unilateral transfer theory’s requirement of a transfer
to no particular person).
76. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (denoting the difference between res
derelictae and res communes).
77. See Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 376 (laying out the elements of abandonment).
78. See id. (stating that unilateral transfer theory “provides little help to a court that must
determine whether a particular set of actions and circumstances amount to a transfer”).
79. Abandonment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (“[T]he exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of
copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1,
1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination.”); id. § 304(c).
81. See generally id. §§ 203(a), 304(c).
82. See generally id. § 304(c) (noting that significant changes can be made to a copyright
by the holder’s descendants).
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rights, there is no transfer to terminate and no opportunity to claw
works back from the public domain.83
With this conceptual understanding of abandonment and the
unique considerations that arise in the copyright context, we turn
below to a different set of concerns—namely, the private and social
costs of copyright abandonment and the ways in which they shape
an owner’s decision to relinquish rights.
II. THE SOCIAL COSTS OF ABANDONMENT
Beyond its theoretical interest, abandonment has important
practical consequences. As a widespread but little appreciated
phenomenon, voluntary relinquishment of property rights generates
costs and benefits both for owners and for society. This Part
explores the social cost calculus of copyright abandonment, contrast-
ing the practice’s upsides and downsides with those of abandoning
physical property. This account in turn informs the puzzle of
copyright abandonment: Why would anyone choose to abandon a
work of authorship?
A. The Social Costs of Abandoning Physical Property
It is easy to imagine why owners of physical things may choose to
abandon them. Physical property can decay, take up space, require
upkeep, and be taxed. As the prevalence of hoarding and the success
of self-storage facilities illustrate, there are real human costs to
having excess stuff. In response, we have witnessed the exploding
popularity of Marie Kondo’s work promising spiritual peace in
giving things away.84
83. One might worry that authors could be coerced into abandoning their works in much
the same way some were pressured to sign unfavorable licenses and assignments. We think
this is unlikely since publishers, the parties most likely to exert such pressure, have little to
gain by placing works they hope to exploit commercially in the public domain. See Elizabeth
Rosenblatt, The Adventure of the Shrinking Public Domain, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 561, 609-14
(2015) (explaining the uncertainties associated with placing materials in the public domain
for both publishers and authors).
84. See generally KONDO, supra note 21, at 177 (describing the importance of decluttering
one’s life as a means to greater well-being).
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In some cases, an owner’s unwanted good is more valuable to
someone else. In an efficient market, that would lead to a voluntary
sale. If you do not want your old couch, and someone else is willing
to pay twenty-five dollars for it, that sale will make both of you
better off. But you may reasonably conclude that the costs of finding
a buyer and engaging in the sale are not worth the effort. If so,
abandonment represents an appealing option. You free yourself of
a piece of furniture and make it available to someone who may
value it more highly, all without the time and trouble of hunting for
a willing seller for a low-value transaction.85
Abandonment is clearly cost justified to owners when it repre-
sents a simple way to rid themselves of low- or negative-value goods.
However, abandonment can inflict corresponding social costs.86 The
fax machine might go unclaimed, cluttering the park. Ultimately, it
may need to be disposed of as garbage at the public’s expense. If so,
abandonment is little more than a means of taking low- or negative-
value property and making it society’s problem. In response, state
and local governments have passed laws that regulate or even ban
abandonment.87
As Strahilevitz highlights, though, a significant number of aban-
doned goods are of high value and result in value-creating trans-
fers.88 People may abandon goods with significant market value if
they are associated with a tragedy for the owner, such as death or
divorce.89 Balls hit into the stands at Major League Baseball (MLB)
games are free for whoever manages to lay claim to them and can be
worth many thousands of dollars.90 Other modern practices, such as
creating digitally powered treasure hunts via geocaching, provide
still more illustrations of the surprising prevalence of abandoning
positive-value property.91
85. Giving the fax machine away presents similar transaction costs. Cf. Strahilevitz,
supra note 18, at 370-71 (“Abandonment is advantageous because it enables an owner to rid
herself of property while incurring neither the transaction costs of a bilateral transfer nor the
decision costs associated with a gift.”).
86. See id. at 372-75 (describing social costs that flow from abandonment).
87. See, e.g., id. at 363-64 (providing examples of regulations placed on abandonment).
88. Id. at 365-71 (enumerating the examples that follow in this paragraph of abandoned
positive-market-value goods).
89. Id. at 364.
90. Id. at 366.
91. Id. at 368-70.
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The motivations for these practices vary. An owner may want to
abandon goods with powerfully negative personal meaning as the
quickest, cheapest means of separating himself from them.92 MLB
likely abandons baseballs hit into the stands because it attracts
more fans to games.93 People who leave items in geocaches are like-
ly doing so due to a combination of intrinsic enjoyment and reciproc-
ity norms.94 Even when disclaimed property is socially valuable,
though, abandoning it threatens to create costs in the form of con-
fusion about the property’s state of title and lawless races to claim
it.95
The actual practice of abandonment is thus more complicated
than a rational choice analysis would predict. While one would
expect abandonment only of low-value goods, owners often abandon
even high-value chattels for a variety of self- and other-regarding
reasons. This quick summary of the costs, benefits, and reality of
physical property abandonment sets the stage for the ensuing
discussion of the very different social welfare calculus of abandoning 
copyrights.
B. The Social Benefits of Abandoning Copyrights
If the abandonment of physical property benefits owners but
results in externalized social costs, the social welfare calculus of
copyright abandonment is nearly a mirror image. As we show,
abandoning a copyright tends to be costly to owners while generat-
ing positive spillovers for society.
1. Private Welfare Effects
The work of authorship is an abstraction. Copyright law vests
rights in creative expression itself—the work of authorship—sep-
arate and apart from the physical medium—books, records, or hard
drives—in which that expression is embodied.96 As currently
92. See id. at 364-65.
93. Id. at 366.
94. Id. at 370.
95. Id. at 374-75 (discussing confusion and lawless-race costs).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a
copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.”).
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structured, copyright ownership thus imposes none of the burdens
that physical chattel ownership does.97 Works of authorship do not
decay; they do not require storage space; and the state does not tax
them.98 In turn, abandoning them does not impose any of the costs
associated with abandoning physical property: no messy disposal,
no risk of cluttering public and private space, and no revenue lost
by the state.99 For these reasons, abandonment of copyrights—even
economically valueless ones—cannot be explained in terms of
relieving owners of the kinds of costs that physical property
ownership may impose.100
Copyright abandonment, thus, seems to bring owners few
monetary benefits. It does, however, threaten owners with some
obvious costs. Abandoning a copyright means forever relinquishing
the ability to extract value from the work by leveraging exclusive
rights.101 In the case of highly valuable works, this could mean
bidding farewell to millions of dollars in royalties—which is why we
are unlikely to see, for example, J.K. Rowling abandon the rights to
Harry Potter.102 Aside from lost revenue, an owner who abandons
97. See Armstrong, supra note 17, at 360 (describing differences between owning a copy-
right and physical chattel). This is, of course, contingent on the design of the copyright sys-
tem. Trademarks and patents impose maintenance fees on owners, which abandonment
eliminates. See infra notes 460-62 and accompanying text. Copyright formalities, such as
renewal and registration, once imposed similar burdens on copyright holders. See infra notes
252-56 and accompanying text. We later discuss forms of architecture that promise to raise
the costs of copyright abandonment to an optimal level. See infra Part IV.
98. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (describing the nature of works that are
subject to copyright); see also infra notes 463-64 and accompanying text (explaining that
under the Berne Convention copyrights cannot be taxed).
99. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text (outlining the social costs that
accompany abandonment of physical property).
100. Ownership of a work can impose certain cognitive and emotional costs, however. The
pressure to review and respond to licensing requests or to police potentially infringing uses
requires time and energy. However, the loss of control over a work can impose its own
burdens. Take, for example, Alan Moore. The author of Watchmen and other massively
popular comic books insists on receiving neither credit nor compensation for adaptations of
his work. See Adam Epstein, HBO’s “Watchmen” Is Great. Its Comic Creator Alan Moore
Wants Nothing to Do with It, QUARTZ (Oct. 21, 2019), https://qz.com/quartzy/1732050/why-
alan-moore-wants-nothing-to-do-with-hbos-watchmen [https://perma.cc/8U8S-65V4].
101. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
102. Mark Le Fanu, Standing Up for Copyright, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2008, 8:54 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2008/sep/10/harry.potter.rowling.copyright
[https://perma.cc/JE7J-4WAW]. See generally J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SOR-
CERER’S STONE (1997).
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their copyright also cedes any ability to prevent uses of the work to
which they object.103 Matt Furie’s infringement lawsuit against
InfoWars’s unauthorized use of Pepe the Frog was inspired not by
pecuniary considerations but by Furie being “dismayed by Pepe’s
association with white supremacy, anti-Semitism, and the alt-
right.”104 Similarly, Carol Highsmith, after donating tens of
thousands of photographs to the Library of Congress, sued Getty
Images after the company charged for licenses to use the images
and failed to properly credit her.105
Of course, most copyrighted works earn little or no revenue.106
Works that are valuable tend to have short economic lifespans, ac-
cruing all of their revenue within a decade or so.107 Even so, owners
may decline to give up their rights on the off chance that they may
start earning again later in life.108 Nassim Nicholas Taleb coined the
phrase “black swan” for a low-probability, high-impact negative
event, like the housing market crash of 2008.109 But there are also
“golden swans”—low-probability, high-impact positive events, such
as winning the lottery.110 Copyright holders may hang on to an
103. Owners have used their copyrights in this defensive fashion since the inception of the
doctrine. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Privative Copyright, 73 VAND. L. REV. 1, 38 (2020)
(tracing the history of censorial uses of copyright to the early 1700s). Scholars disagree about
whether this practice is socially valuable. Compare id. (advancing a limited defense of
censorial copyright), with John Tehranian, The New ©ensorship, 101 IOWA L. REV. 245 (2015)
(criticizing broadly censorial copyright).
104. Bret Barrouquere, Creator of Pepe the Frog Gets Trial Date in Case Against Alex Jones,
S.POVERTY L.CTR. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/09/13/creator-
pepe-frog-gets-trial-date-case-against-alex-jones [https://perma.cc/UDS2-4PJT].
105. See First Amended Complaint at 1-8, Highsmith v. Getty Images, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-
05924-JSR (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016).
106. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
107. Kristelia A. Garcias & Justin McCrary, A Reconsideration of Copyright’s Term, 71 ALA.
L. REV. 351, 383 (2019) (“[M]ost information goods earn the majority of all of the revenue that
they are ever going to make in the first five to ten years following their release.”).
108. See White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 251 (1st Cir. 1911) (“There are
at least sentimental reasons for believing that Congress may have intended that the author,
who according to tradition receives but little for his work, and afterwards sees large profits
made out of it by publishers, should later in life be brought into his kingdom.”).
109. NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE
xxii (2010) (defining a black swan event as possessing “rarity, extreme impact, and
retrospective ... predictability”).
110. See Bill Conerly, Seven Business Strategies for Capturing the Next Golden Swan,
FORBES (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2013/03/08/seven-
business-strategies-for-capturing-the-next-golden-swan/#6aa99e6b6d67 [https://perma.cc/
ST6U-HYNE].
508 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:487
unprofitable work because they hope for such an unlikely event.
While rare, golden swans are not unheard of. John Kennedy Toole
found no publishers for his comic novel, A Confederacy of Dunces, for
decades, eventually taking his life in part over the manuscript’s
apparent failure.111 Only following his death did his mother finally
get the book published, when it became a modern classic and
commercial success.112
Various cognitive biases exacerbate copyright owners’ tenden-
cies to retain ownership of works that appear largely worthless.
Optimism bias causes us to overestimate the chances of good
outcomes.113 This is why lottery tickets sell so well.114 Relatedly, the
endowment effect causes us to overvalue things we own relative to
the fair market value.115 Thus, copyright owners of economically
inert works may rate their appeal far higher than the zero value the
work would actually fetch in open exchange.116 Such owners would
be unwilling to abandon their works, believing against all evidence
that a seller will eventually pay them some inflated price.117
The private welfare calculus of copyright abandonment is the
polar opposite of abandonment of physical chattels. Abandonment
of physical assets flourishes, and must be restrained by law, because
it tends to benefit owners by allowing them to offload the costs of
111. See Karl Miller, An American Tragedy. A Lifetime of Rejection Broke John Kennedy
Toole. But His Aged Mother Believed in His Talent, Found a Publisher for His Novel and
Rescued His Memory from Oblivion, NEW STATESMAN (Mar. 5, 1999), https://www.newstates
man.com/node/148778 [https://perma.cc/986K-268D] (recounting the life and death of Toole
and the posthumous success of A Confederacy of Dunces).
112. Id.
113. Christine Jolls & Cass Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 204
(2006) (“Optimism bias refers to the tendency of people to believe that their own probability
of facing a bad outcome is lower than it actually is.”).
114. See Chris Isidore, We Spend Billions on Lottery Tickets. Here’s Where All That Money
Goes, CNN BUS. (Aug. 24, 2017, 4:44 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/08/24/news/economy/
lottery-spending/index.html [https://perma.cc/ED3C-PDGS].
115. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 211, 213
(Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (explaining and illustrating the endowment effect and describing
it as a manifestation of loss aversion).
116. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property:
An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 14-16 (2010).
117. See Kahneman et al., supra note 115, at 213 (noting that loss aversion will cause an
owner to believe their object is worth more than it is and thus “reduc[e] the set of mutually
acceptable trades”).
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low- or negative-value property.118 By contrast, abandoning a copy-
right seems to be all downside for an owner. Abandonment sacrifices
the ability to profit from or control a work while gaining nothing,
because a copyright imposes no maintenance costs.119 That asym-
metry holds for the public welfare effects of copyright and physical
property abandonment as well.
2. Public Welfare Effects
Compared to physical property, copyright abandonment offers
greater promise for creating social value. For one thing, abandoned
works do not become privately owned by the next taker but rather
enter the public domain.120 Expressive works are, by nature, public
goods: they are both nonrivalrous and nonexcludable.121 By limiting
their reproduction and use, copyright law seeks to convert them to
private goods.122 Abandonment, by contrast, strips away that
artificial scarcity. As a result, abandoning a work generates utility
for the thousands or even millions of people who can now freely
access and use it.123
118. See supra Part II.A (explicating the social costs of abandoning physical property and
why the state limits it).
119. As discussed below, there are nonpecuniary interests that may—and do—motivate
some owners to abandon their works. See infra Part II.C. But from the strictly pecuniary
perspective that typifies copyright policy, owners rarely have incentives to abandon. See
Christopher Buccafusco & David Fagundes, The Moral Psychology of Copyright Infringement,
100 MINN. L. REV. 2433, 2438-44 (2016) (describing copyright’s focus on pecuniary interests
to the exclusion of nonpecuniary ones).
120. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The “public domain” is a term with a
number of overlapping and sometimes competing definitions. Pamela Samuelson, Enriching
Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DUKE L.J. 783, 788-89 (2006). Our definition most closely
resembles Samuelson’s Public Domain 1, with the exception that we limit our discussion to
copyright—to the exclusion of other regimes that may impose limitations on the use of such
works. See id. at 789-90.
121. TOM W.BELL, INTELLECTUAL PRIVILEGE:COPYRIGHT,COMMON LAW, AND THE COMMON
GOOD 45 (2014).
122. See id.
123. See Robert A. Kreiss, Abandoning Copyrights to Try to Cut Off Termination Rights,
58 MO. L. REV. 85, 99 (1993). Abandonment can also reduce information costs associated with
copyright ownership. Given the divisibility and transferability of copyright interests,
identifying the owner of a work is often difficult. See Marley C. Nelson, How to Find a
Copyright Owner, OHIO ST. U.: U. LIBR. (Feb. 3, 2017), https://library.osu.edu/site/copyright/
2017/02/03/how-to-find-a-copyright-owner/ [https://perma.cc/5HK3-3QHJ]. Transfers of copy-
right ownership are generally not recorded, complicating efforts to track rights holders over
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Relatedly, abandonment promotes the distinctive normative aims
of copyright law: increasing public access to information goods.124
For utilitarians, at least, the goal of any body of law is to maximize
social welfare.125 In the context of real and chattel property, law
tends to achieve this end by facilitating the highest-value uses of
land and goods by private owners.126 Copyright, by contrast, seeks
to maximize social value not only by enriching the owners of works.
Rather, the ultimate aim of copyright law is to enrich the public by
incentivizing the production of creative and informative works of
authorship.127 By encouraging the creation of works by means of a
shorter-term monopoly,128 the longer-term goal is to provide the
public with access to a richer array of information goods.129 This
time. See 17 U.S.C. § 205(a) (providing only that transfers of copyrights may be recorded with
the Copyright Office). These difficulties contribute to the orphan works problem—the inability
to identify or locate copyright holders—hampering efforts to license those works. See U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFF., REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS 1 (2006), https://www.copyright.gov/orphan/
orphan-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/3V3G-ZDTJ]. Because abandonment is irrevocable, it
cuts off the possibility of future assignments and exclusive licenses. See supra notes 58-60
and accompanying text. And since it requires some clear evidence of the intent to abandon,
users are more likely to have notice of the work’s public domain status. See supra note 60
and accompanying text. Additionally, abandonment can clarify the status of works with
questionable copyright eligibility.
124. See infra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
125. See RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 4-5 (2005)
(summarizing Bentham’s views on utilitarianism as a preference for choices that tend to
maximize the “greatest happiness” of all affected persons).
126. Cf. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350
(1967) (arguing that property rights emerge in order to allow owners to internalize as much
value as possible from the exploitation of their resources).
127. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“The
monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily
designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which
an important public purpose may be achieved.”).
128. Of course, copyright terms are no longer “shorter term” by any reasonable definition.
On the contrary, consensus has emerged that their current length—life of the author plus
seventy years, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)—is far too long. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll,
Intellectual Property, Antitrust and the New Economy, 62 U.PITT.L.REV. 453, 471 (2001) (“No
plausible incentive rationale exists for this incredibly long duration.”).
129. This is the “incentive/access paradigm” that numerous scholars have invoked as the
central framework for understanding copyright. E.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Is Intellectual
Property Trivial?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2009) (calling the “incentives/access tradeoff
... the familiar foundation for normative discussions about the desirable scope of intellectual
property”). Scholars have called striking the proper balance between incentives and access
“the central problem in copyright law.” William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
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aspiration is rooted in the Constitution, which confers on Congress
the power to create an “exclusive Right” only for “limited Times” and
for the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science.”130 In this
scheme, owners’ rights are only a means to an end, extended as an
incentive only as minimally necessary to encourage the creation of
such works.131
However, the case for the public domain is not merely a matter of
commitment to abstract principles. The public domain has practical,
measurable effects on consumer welfare and creativity.132 First, as
Paul Heald has demonstrated, public domain works are often more
widely available than their copyrighted counterparts.133 Moreover,
public domain works—since they can be offered by a variety of
competing publishers without compensation to rights holders—are
generally less expensive.134 Beyond promoting access, the public
domain facilitates new creative production “by leaving the raw
material of authorship available for authors to use.”135 Derivative
works based on public domain materials have substantial market
value as a source of popular adaptations. In the film industry, for
example, recent years have seen multiple adaptations of Alice in
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. At the time of the Framing, “science” was understood to
extend to creative and informative works. See Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to
Promote?: Defining “Progress” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States
Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 791-92 (2001). But see
Ned Snow, The Meaning of Science in the Copyright Clause, 2013 BYU L. REV. 259, 306-08
(2013) (arguing that the original meaning of “science” was more narrow and excluded speech
unprotected by the First Amendment).
131. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“The copy-
right law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.”).
132. See generally GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE U.S.
RECORDING INDUSTRY 4-5, 215 (2018) (explaining how copyright has actually decreased
creativity in the music industry since the 1960s).
133. Paul J. Heald, How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 829, 829-32 (2014); Paul J. Heald, Property Rights and the Efficient Exploitation of
Copyrighted Works: An Empirical Analysis of Public Domain and Copyrighted Fiction Best-
sellers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2008) [hereinafter Heald, Property Rights].
134. See Heald, Property Rights, supra note 133.
135. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968 (1990).
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Wonderland,136 Peter Pan,137 The Jungle Book,138 Sherlock Holmes,139
King Arthur,140 and Robin Hood,141 among others.
Some critics have argued that abandonment could result in
wasteful overuse of public domain works. Posner and Landes ar-
gue that the owners of works act as stewards, controlling and
limiting their works’ use to make sure that the work is not cheap-
ened by low-quality exploitation.142 But recent scholarship suggests
just the opposite. Studies have shown that the effect of private
ownership on creative production is, at best, indeterminate and
possibly even negative.143 The bulk of the evidence seems to indicate
that innovation and creativity thrive when works are free, not when
they are subject to exclusive rights.144 Other research shows that
136. See TeamEpicReads, 9 Curious Alice in Wonderland Adaptations, EPIC READS (Apr.
11, 2016), https://www.epicreads.com/blog/9-curious-alice-in-wonderland-adaptations/ [https://
perma.cc/B5LB-EXEE].
137. See Johnny Oleksinski, The Best and Worst ‘Peter Pan’ Adaptations, N.Y. POST (Feb.
27, 2020, 1:24 PM), https://www.nypost.com/2020/02/27/the-best-and-worst-peter-pan-adapta
tions/ [https://perma.cc/K4ZB-48JY].
138. See Andrea Schlottman, The Jungle Book Characters: Books and Movie Adaptations
[Ultimate Guide], BOOKS ON THE WALL, https://booksonthewall.com/blog/jungle-book-char
acters-original-stories-movie-adaptations/ [https://perma.cc/KHK6-98UZ].
139. See Christi Carras, The 10 Best Sherlock Holmes Adaptations, According to
Sherlockians, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-
arts/movies/story/2019-09-04/best-sherlock-holmes-movies-tv-shows [https://perma.cc/N7LW-
JJ3H].
140. See Ashley Victoria Robinson, The Top 25 Greatest King Arthur Adaptations,
MANDATORY (May 12, 2017), https://www.mandatory.com/living/1262937-top-25-greatest-king-
arthur-adaptations [https://perma.cc/E2B7-L4UG].
141. See Mary Sollosi, 11 Big-Screen Robin Hoods, Ranked, ENT. WKLY. (June 14, 2019,
4:32 PM), https://ew.com/gallery/ranking-robin-hood-movies/?slide=256462#256462 [https://
perma.cc/X2WC-59VH].
142. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 213 (2003) (“[A]ll valuable resources, including copyrightable
works, should be owned, in order to create incentives for their efficient exploitation and to
avoid overuse.”). Landes and Posner’s argument was rooted in Hardin’s Tragedy of the
Commons, which has since been discredited as descriptively inaccurate and rooted in the
author’s eugenicist beliefs. See Matto Mildenberger, The Tragedy of The Tragedy of the
Commons, SCI. AM. BLOG NETWORK (Apr. 23, 2019), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/
voices/the-tragedy-of-the-tragedy-of-the-commons/ [https://perma.cc/9YJP-9TJU].
143. See generally Eric E. Johnson, Intellectual Property and the Incentive Fallacy, 39 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 623, 624 (2012) (citing and summarizing this literature).
144. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assump-
tions, 51 WM.&MARY L.REV. 513, 515, 528-32 (2009) (“[T]he desire to create can be excessive,
beyond rationality, and free from the need for economic incentive. Psychological and socio-
logical concepts can do more to explain creative impulses than classical economics.... [A]
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entering the public domain does not cause works to disappear. To
the contrary, Chris Buccafusco and Paul Heald have shown that
public domain works are commercialized at a higher rate and a
similar level of quality than copyrighted ones.145 Moreover, we
should expect reduced market demand to discipline producers of
derivatives based on over-exploited public domain works.146 If stu-
dios produce too many Robin Hood films, for example, declining
revenue would make future Robin Hood sequels and reboots less
likely. On the whole, abandonment should translate to greater
commercialization and accessibility, thereby advancing copyright’s
core aspirations.
The public welfare benefits of abandonment are particularly
salient given the long history of owner-friendly legal reforms that
expanded the temporal and substantive breadth of copyrights,
radically reducing the scope of the public domain. Historically,
works have entered the public domain in five ways. First, works
ineligible for copyright protection—those that exhibit insufficient
originality or unfixed works, for example—are part of the public
domain ab initio.147 Second, works enter the public domain at the
expiration of their copyright term.148 Third, under the pre-1978
dual-term regimes, works entered the public domain when copyright
holders neglected to renew.149 Fourth, the failure to comply with
formal requirements of copyright—notice and, less commonly,
deposit—resulted in forfeiture of copyright before 1989.150 Finally,
intentional abandonment of copyright can dedicate works to the
public domain.151
copyright law that treats creativity as a product of economic incentives can miss the mark and
harm what it aims to promote.”).
145. Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Fall
into the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1, 4-5 (2013).
146. See id. at 33.
147. See The Public Domain, U. CAL.: COPYRIGHT, https://copyright.universityofcalifornia.
edu/use/public-domain.html [https://perma.cc/86AA-WJFV].
148. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
149. Id. § 102(a) (requiring originality and fixation as prerequisites for copyright vesting);
see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 15, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT 1 (2006), https://www.
copyright.gov/circs/circ15.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E59-LG9K].
150. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 3, COPYRIGHT NOTICE 1 (2017), https://www.
copyright.gov/circs/circ03.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4A7-3ZCY].
151. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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Aside from abandonment, each of these mechanisms for building
the public domain has faced considerable legislative and judicial
limitations. The congressional expansion of copyright to new cat-
egories of works—sound recordings,152 software,153 and architec-
ture,154 to name a few recent examples—and the arguable embrace
of previously ineligible useful articles by the Supreme Court in Star
Athletica155 have reduced the public domain. A series of copyright
term extensions, beginning in 1831156 and culminating in the
Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998,157 have slowed the flow of
works into the public domain to a trickle. Until 2019, no works
had joined the U.S. public domain through this mechanism for
two decades.158 No works created under the current statute will
enter the public domain until the end of 2048, at the earliest.159
Moreover, renewal failures were reasonably common until the 1976
Act adopted the current unitary term of protection.160 That shift
removed the opt-in character of the second half of copyright terms,
thereby eliminating a simple mechanism for sorting works of low
perceived value into the public domain.161 Perhaps most impor-
tantly, neither the notice nor the deposit requirements carry the
152. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
153. Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 117, 94 Stat. 3015,
3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 117).
154. Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 120, 104 Stat.
5133 (1990).
155. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1019 (2017) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
156. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
157. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b), (d), 112
Stat. 2827-28 (1998).
158. See Allison Davenport, Here’s Why We’re Celebrating the Public Domain in 2019,
WIKIMEDIA FOUND. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://wikimediafoundation.org/news/2019/01/08/heres-
why-were-celebrating-the-public-domain-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/4ZP2-7887].
159. Assuming an author created a work on January 1, 1978 and died that same day,
copyright would persist for an additional seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
160. See Zvi S. Rosen & Richard Schwinn, An Empirical Study of 225 Years of Copyright
Registrations, 94 TUL. L. REV. 1003, 1039-43 (2020) (calculating a renewal rate for all U.S.
copyrighted works ranging from roughly 10 percent to 20 percent throughout the twentieth
century); Sean Redmond, U.S. Copyright History 1923-1964, N.Y. PUB. LIBR. (May 31, 2019),
https://www. nypl.org/blog/2019/05/31/us-copyright-history-1923-1964 [https://perma.cc/JX7K-
4RK4] (reporting a renewal rate of roughly 25 percent for books from 1923-1964).
161. See Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 498
(2004) (pointing out that with bifurcated terms, owners of lower-value works would decline
to file for renewal, causing those works to enter the public domain after twenty-eight years).
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risk of forfeiture today.162 As a result of the shift from a system in
which copyright required authors to opt in to a system in which
copyrights vest automatically upon fixation,163 trillions of works that
would have otherwise been part of the public domain are instead
subject to copyright.164 The Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994
even created, for the first time, a mechanism by which parties could
restore the copyrights in works that had reached the public do-
main.165 Even when works are unquestionably in the public domain,
litigants and would-be rights holders have found ways to impose
limitations on their use.166 Given these restraints, abandonment
remains one of the few means to funnel works into the public
domain.
Today, copyright terms regularly extend for well over a hundred
years.167 But abandonment can render a work free for common use
well in advance of the statutory term. Because abandonment
reflects an owner’s choice to cede rights in their work, it allows
owners themselves to determine the proper length of their exclusive
rights.168
162. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, §§ 7-8, 102
Stat. 2853.
163. See id.
164. In 2018 alone, an estimated 1.2 trillion photos were taken worldwide. Caroline
Cakebread, People Will Take 1.2 Trillion Digital Photos This Year—Thanks to Smartphones,
BUS.INSIDER (Aug. 31, 2017, 7:50 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/12-trillion-photos-to-
be-taken-in-2017-thanks-to-smartphones-chart-2017-8 [https://perma.cc/S7EX-KCZA]. Nearly
three hundred billion emails are sent every day. 19 Fascinating Email Facts, LIFEWIRE (Mar.
15, 2020), https://www.lifewire.com/how-many-emails-are-sent-every-day-1171210 [https://
perma.cc/RE3R-YV56].
165. 17 U.S.C. § 104A(a) (allowing restoration of copyright for works by foreign authors
that had fallen into the public domain for failure to comply with pre-1976 Act statutory
formalities); see Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 308 (2012) (affirming constitutionality of
URAA’s copyright restoration provisions).
166. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Ent., Inc., v. X One X Prods. Inc., 644 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir.
2011); Rosenblatt, supra note 83, at 567.
167. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 15A, DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 1 (2011), https://
www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15a.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MSP-CXT3].
168. If an owner feels that $20,000 suffices as fair reward for their work, and they extract
that amount from a work within ten years, then they can abandon it and allow the public free
access to it without sacrificing any incentive effects. By contrast, the current copyright
term—life of the author plus seventy years—is at best a crude approximation of the lifespan
of an author’s heirs, and is untethered to any notion of optimal incentives. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a). A group of prominent economists signed on to an amicus brief in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
a Supreme Court case challenging the constitutionality of the copyright term extension. 537
U.S. 186, 190 (2003). These economists concluded that “it is highly unlikely that the economic
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3. Comparing Creative Commons
As a tool for addressing the ubiquity and duration of copyright
protection, abandonment shares some traits with permissive
licenses like those provided by Creative Commons.169 Those licenses
give copyright holders the option to free their works from some of
the restrictions normally imposed by copyright law, facilitating uses
by the public without requiring cumbersome negotiations for each
and every use.170 Both abandonment and permissive licensing offer
paths for creators who prefer to forego some measure of their
statutory copyright entitlements.
Abandonment and Creative Commons licenses (hereinafter “CC
licenses”) play related but distinct roles in the copyright system.
Abandonment effectuates a complete and total transfer to the public
domain, while permissive licensing allows copyright holders to
permit some uses while forbidding others.171 This basic operational
distinction gives rise to two important differences between abandon-
ment and permissive licensing.
First, abandonment is irrevocable. It results in public domain
status and the destruction of any exclusive rights in the work. The
former owner has no legal mechanism for reclaiming a copyright
once abandoned.172 CC licenses are, by their own terms, irrevo-
cable.173 There are at least two considerations that cast doubt on
this insistence, however. For one thing, copyright licenses are
benefits from copyright [term] extension ... outweigh the additional costs.” Brief for George
A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-
618), 2002 WL 1041846, at *3. Of course, many works were not created due to any incentive
effects, such as emails, cell phone photos, and even some art and literature. Authors un-
concerned about royalties or control should be willing to cede their works to the public domain
at zero cost—if they had a simple way to do so.
169. About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ [https://
perma.cc/YK7V-RE53] (explaining the nature of Creative Commons licenses).
170. Id.
171. Compare supra note 57 and accompanying text, with About the Licenses, supra note
169.
172. See supra Part I.B.
173. See, e.g., Attribution 4.0 International, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode [https://perma.cc/8PM4-22HN] (“Subject to the terms and
conditions of this Public License, the Licensor hereby grants You a worldwide, royalty-free,
non-sublicensable, non-exclusive, irrevocable license to exercise the Licensed Rights in the
Licensed Material.”).
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generally revocable in the absence of consideration.174 As bare
grants of permission, the CC licenses likely lack the sort of consider-
ation that would prompt a court to treat their irrevocability as a
binding contractual term.175 Even if CC licenses are not revocable at
will, they are likely subject to the Copyright Act’s termination of
transfer provisions, which extend to both exclusive and nonexclusive
licenses.176 Nor does the language describing the CC license as
“irrevocable” warrant a different conclusion, because statutory ter-
mination of transfer operates regardless of license terms to the
contrary.177 Abandonment, for better or worse, is permanent in a
way no license can be.178
The second difference between abandonment and permissive
licenses relates to information costs.179 CC licenses, for example,
allow licensors some measure of choice in how their works can be
used. For example, they permit licensors to allow or disallow
commercial uses and derivative works.180 That flexibility comes at
the cost of ambiguity, however. How do users know whether a use
174. Generally, nonexclusive licenses are revocable in the absence of consideration. Avtec
Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 574 n.12 (4th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n implied license is necessarily
nonexclusive and revocable absent consideration.”); Keane Dealer Servs., Inc. v. Harts, 968
F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“If no consideration was given, the license was revocable,
and the institution of this lawsuit would constitute revocation.” (citing Peer Int’l Corp. v. Luna
Records, 887 F. Supp. 560, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1995))); Johnson v. Jones, 885 F. Supp. 1008, 1012
n.6 (E.D. Mich. 1995); see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, § 10.02(B)(5).
A license that is irrevocable on its own terms will be treated as such only when it is
incorporated into an otherwise enforceable contract. See State St. Glob. Advisors Tr. Co. v.
Visbal, No. 1:19-cv-01719-GHW, 2020 WL 71162, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2020) (quoting
Nano-Proprietary, Inc. v. Canon, Inc., 537 F.3d 394, 400 (5th Cir. 2008)) (“[T]he Copyright
License Agreement states that the license is irrevocable. An irrevocable license is ‘[i]mpossible
to retract or revoke.’” (second alteration in original)).
175. See About the Licenses, supra note 169 (describing the process to obtain a Creative
Commons license, which does not include consideration).
176. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (“[T]he exclusive or nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of
copyright or of any right under a copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1,
1978, otherwise than by will, is subject to termination.”).
177. Id. § 203(a)(5).
178. Lydia Loren has argued that CC licenses should be understood as a partial
abandonment of copyright as a means of increasing their reliability and durability. See Loren,
Building a Reliable Semicommons, supra note 17, at 325-27.
179. Open licensing regimes entail a range of transaction costs. These include initial review
of works and their license terms, due diligence for mergers and acquisitions, and management
of internal use and external distribution of open-licensed materials. See Clark D. Asay, A Case
for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 768-775 (2013).
180. About the Licenses, supra note 169.
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is commercial?181 How do they distinguish between derivatives and
mere reproductions?
IBM recently came under fire for using nearly a million CC-
licensed images harvested from Flickr as training data for facial
recognition research.182 Many copyright holders were outraged by
this unexpected use of their images, prompting Creative Commons
to issue a statement183 and update its frequently asked questions to
address the intersection of CC-licensed works and AI.184 For licen-
sors who permitted commercial use, IBM’s facial recognition system
revealed potential unintended and unforeseen consequences.185 For
those who limited their works to noncommercial use, it highlighted
the ambiguity of CC license terms as applied to early stage
research.186 The simplicity of abandonment would again prevent
either outcome. Works dedicated to the public domain are available
for all to use, with no exceptions or restrictions.187
Software provides another case study in the challenges that
permissive licenses sometimes create. Early software developers
pioneered permissive licensing,188 but the licenses they rely on do
not always clearly reflect their intent. Sometimes developers adopt
licenses they incorrectly believe dedicate their contributions to the
public domain; other times developers who likely dedicated their
181. The question of the scope of the Creative Commons noncommercial license has been
litigated at least twice. See Great Minds v. Off. Depot, Inc., 945 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
2019) (holding that licensees can rely on third parties, including commercial copy shops, to
exercise their rights under the license); Great Minds v. Fedex Off. & Print Servs., Inc., 886
F.3d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding the same).
182. Olivia Solon, Facial Recognition’s ‘Dirty Little Secret’: Millions of Online Photos
Scraped Without Consent, NBC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2019, 11:25 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/
tech/internet/facial-recognition-s-dirty-little-secret-millions-online-photos-scraped-n981921
[https://perma.cc/EQ2Q-PZ6H].
183. Ryan Merkley, Use and Fair Use: Statement on Shared Images in Facial Recognition
AI, CREATIVE COMMONS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://creativecommons.org/2019/03/13/statement-
on-shared-images-in-facial-recognition-ai/ [https://perma.cc/59RQ-MH7E].
184. Artificial Intelligence and CC Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.
org/faq/#artificial-intelligence-and-cc-licenses55 [https://perma.cc/M2DB-BAF3].
185. See Solon, supra note 182 (noting that most people were unaware their images were
being used and that “there is no easy way of finding out whose images are included”).
186. See Artificial Intelligence and CC Licenses, supra note 184 (outlining ambiguities
associated with CC licenses and artificial intelligence).
187. See supra Part I.B.
188. See Asay, supra note 179, at 793-94; Sapna Kumar, Enforcing the GNU GPL, 2006 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 8-9 (dating the origin of “copyleft licenses” to the late 1980s and the
work of Richard Stallman).
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works to the public domain distribute them with copyright.189 These
misunderstandings about the practical impact of permissive licenses
are widespread. Indeed, Clark Asay has argued that the chief
reason abandonment is not more common among software
developers—despite their apparent desire to dedicate works to the
public—is the lack of clarity surrounding license terms.190 A regime
that provided owners a clear pathway to abandonment would avoid
this ambiguity.191
Some massively successful software projects have been released
under generous permissive licenses, suggesting that abandonment
may appeal to developers as well.192 Even if former blockbusters are
unlikely to be abandoned, a functioning abandonment doctrine can
still substantially enrich the public domain. Thanks to the low
standards of the 1976 Act,193 copyright inheres in all manner of
works that appear to have minimal freestanding commercial value:
your last email to a coworker, that photo you hastily took on your
phone, and even this Article. Of course, few are counting down the
days until the smartphone photo you took of your lunch last week
189. Asay, supra note 179, at 791 n.213 (recounting examples of licenses).
190. Id. at 790. Even users of such software are sometimes dissuaded by the risk associated
with unclear license terms. Id. at 785.
191. Even the Library of Congress uses ambiguous language when it makes acquired works
freely available to the public to “use and reuse.” Free to Use and Reuse Sets, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/free-to-use [https://perma.cc/RC3P-CUH5]. For example, the Library
“purchased the intellectual property rights” for the John Margolies Roadside America
Photograph Archive, which comprises some eleven thousand photos taken over forty years.
Wendi Maloney, Free to Use and Reuse: John Margolies Photographs of Roadside America,
LIBR. OF CONG. (July 6, 2017), https://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2017/07/free-to-use-and-reuse-john-
margolies-photographs-of-roadside-america/ [https://perma.cc/NS4T-KXCM]. According to the
Library, since it owns the rights to the photos, “there are no known copyright restrictions on
the photographs.” John Margolies Roadside America Photograph Archive, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/print/res/723_marg.html [https://perma.cc/R528-MUQ9]. We think this
statement is likely insufficient evidence of intent to abandon, suggesting that the Library of
Congress itself lacks sufficient guidance for eliminating copyright restrictions on works it
promotes for free public use.
192. About 250 million people use Firefox, the web browser distributed under the
permissive Mozilla Public License. See Firefox Public Data Report, FIREFOX, https://data.fire
fox.com/dashboard/user-activity [https://perma.cc/T4UX-UXXT] (reflecting data through mid-
December 2019). And the Apache HTTP Server, distributed under the eponymous license,
serves more than three hundred million websites. January 2020 Web Server Survey,
NETCRAFT (Jan. 21, 2020),  https://news.netcraft.com/archives/2020/01/21/january-2020-web-
server-survey.html [https://perma. cc/6PKL-A8QY].
193. All that is required for copyright to vest in a work of authorship is fixation of an
original work in a “tangible medium of expression.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
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is free from copyright, and some might question the merit of adding
a raft of similarly low-value works to the public domain.
But works that have little value standing alone may have
considerable value in the aggregate.194 As technology develops, new
uses of works may emerge that leverage a more extensive public
domain. As Google’s efforts to index images and scan books
demonstrate, a searchable corpus of individual works has value
greater than the sum of its parts.195 Although both of those pro-
grams were ultimately endorsed as fair uses, they were limited in
ways that lessened their social utility.196 Google Image Search offers
access to thumbnail images, not full resolution originals, and Google
Books provides users snippets of copyrighted books in the absence
of a license.197 Public domain books, in contrast, can be viewed in
full and used without restriction.198 While successful assertions of
fair use can secure some of the same benefits of abandonment, such
assertions are often expensive and risky. Established firms, such
as Google, can expend the resources necessary to test a novel fair
use theory. But abandonment offers greater clarity ex ante, favoring
smaller actors.
Artificial intelligence training data presents another compelling
case for a public domain reinvigorated with works that may appear
to have little stand-alone value. For better or worse, artificial
intelligence promises to shift decision-making from humans to the
automated systems they design. From the workplace,199 to driving,200
194. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., About Google Books, GOOGLE BOOKS, https://www.google.com/googlebooks/
about/ [https://perma.cc/4NGJ-BEK3]; Add an Image to Google, GOOGLE SEARCH HELP, https://
support.google.com/websearch/answer/175288?hl=en [https://perma.cc/9VWH-K5YX].
196. See, e.g., David Kravets, Fair Use Prevails As Supreme Court Rejects Google Books
Copyright Case, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 18, 2016, 11:17 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/
2016/04/fair-use-prevails-as-supreme-court-rejects-google-books-copyright-case/ [https://
perma.cc/FQE3-ZSZC].
197. See About Google Books, supra note 195; Add an Image to Google, supra note 195.
198. About the Library Project, GOOGLE SEARCH HELP, https://support.google.com/web
search/answer/9690276?h1=en [https://perma.cc/2FMT-RQD3].
199. Ted Greenwald, How AI Is Transforming the Workplace, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2017,
6:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-ai-is-transforming-the-workplace-1489371060
[https://perma.cc/J59P-U928].
200. See, e.g., Sigal Samuel, A New Study Finds a Potential Risk with Self-Driving Cars:
Failure to Detect Dark-Skinned Pedestrians, VOX (Mar. 6, 2019, 10:50 AM), https://www.vox.
com/future-perfect/2019/3/5/18251924/self-driving-car-racial-bias-study-autonomous-vehicle-
dark-skin [https://perma.cc/7DSG-TJZ3].
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to writing pop music,201 AI systems will play an increasingly im-
portant role in our lives. Many AI systems “learn” to make decisions
by processing massive collections of human-created texts, images,
and recordings.202 As Amanda Levendowski has argued, copyright
law has contributed to the biases AI systems exhibit by steering
developers towards particular sorts of training data.203
AI developers, for example, have made repeated use of the
collection of 1.6 million emails sent between Enron employees
because of their perceived public domain status and the low legal
risk associated with their use.204 Training AI how to write and think
using the emails of employees of a company engaged in massive
fraud presents obvious problems. However, as Levendowski notes,
existing public domain works embed their own potential biases.205
The bulk of the public domain is comprised of works published
before 1925—works written predominantly by wealthy white men,
reflecting the prejudices and assumptions of their era.206 A public
domain populated by contemporary works, even those with little
independent commercial value, would better reflect the values and
composition of society.
In addition, such a reinvigorated public domain could signifi-
cantly reduce the transaction costs introduced by automatic
copyright protection. Creators of all sizes, from independent docu-
mentarians and university presses to Hollywood studios and
massive trade publishers, expend considerable time and effort in
clearing often incidental uses of copyrighted material.207 This
201. Bartu Kaleagasi, A New AI Can Write Music As Well As a Human Composer,
FUTURISM (Mar. 9, 2017), https://futurism.com/a-new-ai-can-write-music-as-well-as-a-human-
composer [https://perma.cc/JPT7-EQ3H].
202. See, e.g., Greenwald, supra note 199 (noting that artificial intelligence products “aim
to analyze a vast amount of data and search for patterns”).
203. Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence's Implicit
Bias Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 589 (2018). There is, of course, no guarantee that
abandoned works would not introduce their own biases. But increased availability of public
domain training data would tend to alleviate these concerns on the whole.
204. Id. at 610-11.
205. Id. at 589.
206. Id. at 615.
207. See, e.g., Michael Rosen, Hollywood CGI Copyrights Under Fire in New Technology,
AM.ENTER.INST. (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/intellectual-
property/hollywood-cgi-copyrights-under-fire-in-new-technology-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/
U5ST-ZV3T] (describing one such lawsuit between a software creator and Hollywood studio
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clearance process is frustrated by fractured rights, orphan works,
and other practical hurdles.208 As a result, transaction costs can
frustrate otherwise mutually desirable licenses.209 Because nearly
every photo or piece of music created in the last forty years is
protected by copyright, the cost of clearance is one creators and
distributors must bear. CC licenses have significantly reduced those
costs by communicating a set of permissions for subsequent users
that do not require further negotiation.210 But those permissions
are not always sufficient and sometimes introduce ambiguity that
militates in favor of an explicit license.211 Abandonment, on the
other hand, simplifies the status of a work and eliminates the need
for clearance costs.
Abandonment of copyrighted works also avoids the social costs
typically associated with the abandonment of physical property.
Abandoned things create high disposal costs for society.212 Because
works of authorship have no physical existence, they do not
threaten to create clutter. Strahilevitz also shows that abandoned
goods threaten costly races to claim title.213 When abandoned copy-
rights become part of the public domain, free for all to use, there is
no need to rush to become their next owner.214 Finally, Strahilevitz
raises the concern that the presence of abandoned goods creates
confusion about who owns things, and whether they are owned at
all.215 This concern is relevant for copyright, which is already dogged
by confusion about the ownership of works. Abandonment could
make ascertaining title even more complex for some works. A
properly administered abandonment doctrine would reduce those
over CGI characters).
208. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS DIGITIZATION 105 (2015),
https://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/GWB4-
LW3R]; see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright
Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 604-13 (2010) (describing the proliferation and fragmentation of
copyrights under the 1976 Act).
209. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 208, at 105.
210. See About the Licenses, supra note 169.
211. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
212. See Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 372-75 (laying out several social costs associated
with abandoning physical property).
213. Id. at 388.
214. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
215. See Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 372-73.
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information costs by clearly communicating the public domain
status of works.216
It is also worth questioning the assumption that owners will
abandon only low- or zero-value works. Strahilevitz has shown that
abandonment of higher-value physical property is surprisingly
common.217 As we detail below, the same is true for information
goods, which creators often aspire to place their works into the
public domain.
C. Revealed Preferences and Attempted Abandonment
The social cost calculus of abandoning copyrights is the polar
opposite of the social cost calculus of abandoning physical property.
Abandoning physical property tends to benefit owners while shifting
costs onto society, allowing owners to externalize the costs of low- or
negative-value property.218 By contrast, abandoning copyrights can
be costly for owners but beneficial for the public.219 It provides a
means to shorten overly long copyright terms and route works into
the public domain. This distinct cost-benefit mix raises a puzzle. If
copyright abandonment inflicts costs on owners, and primarily
benefits the public, why would owners ever abandon their work?
Despite what rational choice theory might predict, many copy-
right owners (individuals and institutions alike) seek to place
high-value works in the public domain. Both artists and institutions
seek to give up control over their works. Photographer Carol High-
smith, for example, has donated tens of thousands of photos to the
Library of Congress, expressly seeking to relinquish copyright.220
Jason Rohrer, the developer of popular video games such as One
Hour One Life, disclaims any copyright and considers his works part
of the public domain.221 Software developers have released their
216. See infra Part IV.
217. Strahilevitz, supra note 18, at 368-70.
218. Id. at 372.
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. Carey Dunne, Photographer Files $1 Billion Suit Against Getty for Licensing Her
Public Domain Images, HYPERALLERGIC (July 27, 2016), https://hyperallergic.com/314079/
photographer-files-1-billion-suit-against-getty-for-licensing-her-public-domain-images/
[https://perma.cc/PJZ4-SHNR].
221. Jason Rohrer (@jasonrohrer), Open Letter to the Mobile Developers, ONE HOUR ONE
LIFE FS. (Mar. 1, 2019, 5:48 AM), http://onehouronelife.com/forums/viewtopic.php?id=5479
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programs for decades under either explicit public domain dedica-
tions or pursuant to licenses that approximate such dedication.222
And museums such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art have sought
to dedicate tens of thousands of works to the public domain.223
Demand for a simple mechanism to disclaim copyright was suf-
ficiently high that Creative Commons developed its CC0 designa-
tion. Unlike typical permissive licenses that rely on copyright
ownership, CC0 is meant to “place [designated works] as completely
as possible in the public domain,”224 reflecting the rights holder’s
“wish to permanently relinquish those rights to a Work for the
purpose of contributing to a commons of creative, cultural and
scientific works.”225 Given the uncertainty surrounding the legal
status and application of abandonment, even Creative Commons
acknowledges the difficulty of dedicating a work to the public
domain before the expiration of the statutory copyright term.226 The
key operative provision of the CC0 instrument outlines a “waiver”
of copyright:
To the greatest extent permitted by, but not in contravention of,
applicable law, Affirmer hereby overtly, fully, permanently,
irrevocably and unconditionally waives, abandons, and surren-
ders all of Affirmer’s Copyright and Related Rights ... fully
intending that such Waiver shall not be subject to revocation,
rescission, cancellation, termination, or any other legal or
equitable action.227
In addition, the CC0 terms contain a “fallback” license.228 In the
event the waiver is deemed legally invalid, the terms provide for “a
[https://perma.cc/C4D6-S5HL].
222. See, e.g., Balter, supra note 14 (noting that many software developers on GitHub
utilize open source licenses).
223. See Image and Data Resources, METRO. MUSEUM OF ART, https://www.metmuseum.
org/about-the-met/policies-and-documents/image-resources [https://perma.cc/7PZ4-WGLR].
224. CC0, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/share-your-work/public-
domain/cc0 [https://perma.cc/W36V-4YKN].
225. CC0 1.0 Universal, CREATIVE COMMONS LEGAL CODE, https://creativecommons.org/
publicdomain/zero/1.0/legalcode [https://perma.cc/F56L-79VD].
226. The shift from earlier Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication to CC0 reflects,
in part, these challenges. See Armstrong, supra note 17, at 396-97.
227. CREATIVE COMMONS LEGAL CODE, supra note 225.
228. Id.
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royalty-free, non transferable, non sublicensable, non exclusive,
irrevocable and unconditional license to exercise Affirmer’s Copy-
right and Related Rights in the Work.”229 In part, this belt-and-
suspenders tactic is demanded by the global reach of Creative
Commons. CC0 is meant to apply across jurisdictions with very
different approaches to copyright abandonment.230 As Part III
demonstrates, it also reflects the confused and unsettled law of
abandonment in U.S. copyright law.
Despite the uncertainty as to its precise legal effect, CC0 has been
widely adopted. Nina Paley’s critically acclaimed film Sita Sings the
Blues is distributed under the CC0 instrument.231 The same is true
for nearly four million photos, including almost four hundred
thousand images from the Metropolitan Museum of Art,232 one
hundred thousand from the Paris Musées,233 and thirty thousand
from the Cleveland Museum of Art.234 Websites such as Freesound
offer hundreds of CC0 sound recordings.235
Prior to the emergence of the contemporary “free software”
movement, which relies on copyright to both grant permission and
often to impose restrictions on the use of licensed works, many early
software developers contributed their works to the public domain.236
Such works were often distributed without copyright notices and
were assumed to be free of any exclusive rights.237 In the post-Berne
229. Id.
230. See id. (noting that the waiver applies “in all territories worldwide”).
231. Nina Paley, Ahimsa: Sita Sings the Blues Now CC-0 “Public Domain,” NINA PALEY:
BLOG (Jan. 18, 2013), https://blog.ninapaley.com/2013/01/18/ahimsa-sita-sings-the-blues-now-
cc-0-public-domain/ [https://perma.cc/2GKM-D8Q6].
232. Jennie Rose Halperin, New York’s Metropolitan Museum of Art Releases 375,000
Digital Works for Remix and Re-use Online via CC0, CREATIVE COMMONS (Feb. 7, 2017),
https://creativecommons.org/2017/02/07/met-announcement/ [https://perma.cc/JK8X-ZQ8U].
233. Victoria Heath, Paris Musées Releases 100,000+ Works into the Public Domain,
CREATIVE COMMONS (Jan. 10, 2020), https://creativecommons.org/2020/01/10/paris-musees-
releases-100000-works-into-the-public-domain/ [https://perma.cc/R33A-94B3].
234. Jennie Rose Halperin, CC0 at the Cleveland Museum of Art: 30,000 High Quality
Digital Images Now Available, CREATIVE COMMONS (Jan. 23, 2019), https://creativecommons.
org/2019/01/23/cleveland-museum [https://perma.cc/LMG7-F6VL].
235. See License: Creative Commons 0,FREESOUND, https://freesound.org/search/?g=1&q=
creative%20commons&f=%20license:%22Creative+Commons+0%22 [https://perma.cc/5XW9-
SR8G].
236. Tom Shea, Free Software Is a Junkyard of Software Spare Parts, 5 INFOWORLD 31, 32
(June 27, 1983).
237. See, e.g., Kumar, supra note 188, at 8-9 (describing the “copyleft license,” an example
of an early permissive software license).
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era of automatic copyright protection, more proactive strategies
emerged. While various popular free software licenses continue to
leverage copyright protection, in 2010, developer Arto Bendiken
released the Unlicense, an instrument designed to “dedicate any
and all copyright interest in the software to the public domain ... in
perpetuity of all present and future rights.”238 More than one
hundred thousand projects on GitHub are made available under the
terms of the Unlicense.239
These examples reveal that the motivations for abandonment go
beyond pure economic calculations. That is not to say placing a work
in the public domain could not redound to the author’s financial
benefit. A work that is widely available at no cost may increase an
author’s visibility, spark interest in other work, or lead to opportuni-
ties for live performance or other paid services.240 Jason Rohrer, for
example, still makes money from the games he makes and dedicates
to the public domain by charging for access to the servers on which
they are played.241
Alternatively, placing a work in the public domain may bring
owners subjective satisfaction. Empirical evidence has shown that
giving property away can bring the owner greater subjective well-
being than hanging onto it for profit.242 Carol Highsmith’s donation
of works to the Library of Congress, which the Library itself called
“one of the greatest acts of generosity” in its history, falls into this
category.243 Abandonment may also contribute to an author’s
238. Unlicense Yourself: Set Your Code Free, UNLICENSE.ORG, https://unlicense.org [https://
perma.cc/N7WL-68J6].
239. Balter, supra note 14.
240. This is a classic “loss leader” in which someone gives away something in the short-
term in the hope of making larger profits at a later time by stimulating demand and/or
creating consumer goodwill. See Mona Bushnell, What Are Loss Leaders? Should Your Online
Business Offer Them?, BUS.NEWSDAILY (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/
11109-loss-leader-online.html [https://perma.cc/G4AL-AX36] (explaining loss leaders and how
they are utilized in business).
241. See Rohrer, supra note 221 (“Piracy simply isn’t an issue for a server-based game.”).
Although Rohrer stands by his decision to dedicate his games to the public domain, he has
expressed frustration over adaptations of those games that fail to provide him with
attribution or falsely suggest his involvement. Id.
242. Dave Fagundes, Why Less Property Is More: Inclusion, Dispossession, & Subjective
Well-Being, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1365-66 (2018) (collecting studies showing that other-
oriented uses of property, such as giving to charities, tend to increase subjective well-being
more than self-oriented uses).
243. Dunne, supra note 220.
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reputation or sense of belonging within her community. Before the
development of the contemporary “free software” movement, for
example, a community of programmers sought to cede their code to
the public domain.244 Beyond community norms, abandonment
allows owners to express and further their ideology, dedicating
works to the public domain as a political or cultural gesture.245
The mismatch between rational choice predictions and the reality
of abandonment provides another illustration of the variety of
motivations that shapes the relationship between creators and their
works. Nonpecuniary interests spur not only the creation of new
works246 but copyright enforcement as well.247 Abandonment is no
different. Rational choice alone cannot capture the variety of
reasons that owners abandon their works. This point will be crucial
when we turn to optimizing abandonment in Part IV.
The social costs of abandoning copyrights are the opposite of those
accompanying physical property abandonment. While abandoning
chattels tends to benefit owners and to externalize costs to society,
abandoning copyrights appears to be costly only to owners while
conferring significant benefits to society. Despite this inverse cost-
benefit equation, abandonment—or at least attempts at it—occurs
with surprising frequency. As the next Part reveals, however, the
law of abandonment frustrates both rights holders and potential
users of their works.
244. See Unlicense Yourself: Set Your Code Free, supra note 238.
245. See, e.g., Rachelle Hampton, Broadly’s New “Gender Spectrum” Photo Library Will
Change How the World Sees Trans People, SLATE (Mar. 26, 2019, 5:50 PM), https://slate.com/
human-interest/2019/03/broadly-gender-spectrum-trans-stock-photo-collection.html
[https://perma.cc/W52S-UKVH] (describing an open-access stock photo archive designed to
make it easier for users to include images of gender nonbinary people in their depictions of
everyday life).
246. This is true for both professionals and hobbyists. See JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA
MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6-8 (2015)
(interviewing creators to reveal a variety of motivations far beyond economic self-interest);
Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 653-54 (1997) (outlining the culture of fan fiction and its relationship
to law). 
247. See Buccafusco & Fagundes, supra note 119, at 2435-36 (showing that infringement
lawsuits are often motivated by moral considerations rather than purely economic ones);
Tehranian, supra note 103, at 258 (cataloguing numerous copyright infringement lawsuits
designed only to suppress expression the owner dislikes).
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III. THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT ABANDONMENT
As Part II revealed, a surprising number of copyright holders seek
to abandon their works, even works of nontrivial value. For copy-
right holders who prefer abandonment, the legal mechanisms by
which a work can be fully abandoned remain far from clear. The
Copyright Act contains no abandonment provision; the Copyright
Office, while accepting notices of abandonment, declines to weigh in
on their legal effect; and although the courts generally agree on the
basic doctrinal framework for abandonment, their application of
that test has been inconsistent and unpredictable.248 Not only does
a copyright holder committed to abandoning their work lack a clear,
reliable mechanism for parting with their creation, but the copy-
right system lacks any broadly accessible record of abandoned
works, further undermining the practical effectiveness of abandon-
ment.249 In this Part, we outline the statutory, administrative, and
judicial treatment of abandonment. We focus particular attention on
the ways in which courts have struggled to articulate and consis-
tently apply a clear abandonment standard.
A. Statutory Silence
The Copyright Act of 1976 says nothing about abandonment.250
Neither do the Acts of 1909 or 1790.251 The failure to explicitly
address abandonment is perhaps understandable under the pre-
1976 regimes, given their opt-in structure. Under those earlier
Acts, owners who did not want a copyright could simply decline to
engage in the formalities necessary for federal protection.252 But
under the 1976 Act, copyrights vest automatically.253 The resulting
248. See infra Part III.C.2.
249. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
250. The terms “abandon” and “abandonment” do not appear in Title 17 of the United
States Code. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1327.
251. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 1-5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-88; Act of May 31, 1790, ch.
15, §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. 124, 124-26.
252. See §§ 1-5, 35 Stat. at 1075-88 (outlining the process for opting into copyright
protection).
253. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-02(a).
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proliferation of copyrights makes the lack of any abandonment
mechanism a more consequential absence.
Prior to the 1976 Act, federal statutory copyright protected works
only if they were published with proper notice. If an author
published a work within the meaning of the statute without
adequate notice, they forfeited federal copyright and the work
entered the public domain.254 Although Congress may not have
designed these forfeiture rules with abandonment in mind, an
author determined to abandon their work could easily leverage
copyright’s formal requirements to do so.255 They simply needed to
publish the work without notice, and it would be free for all to
use.256 In effect, copyright formalities created a statutory back door
for abandonment.
As of January 1, 1978—the effective date of the 1976 Act—federal
law protects all copyrightable works from the instant of their
creation, regardless of whether or not they are published. Any work
of authorship sufficient to satisfy the low bar of originality is
imbued with copyright protection from the moment it is fixed in a
tangible medium.257 Initially, an owner could still lose a vested
copyright upon publication without proper notice under the 1976
Act, although this omission could be cured.258 Since the United
States enacted legislation in 1989 to comply with the Berne
254. See Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 83 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If the
owner failed to satisfy the Act’s requirements, the published work was interjected irrevocably
into the public domain precluding any subsequent protection of the work under the 1909
Copyright Act.”). In response to the harsh consequences of publication without proper notice,
courts developed the distinction between general and limited publication. The latter did not
result in forfeiture. See White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1952) (“[A] limited
publication which communicates the contents of a manuscript to a definitely selected group
and for a limited purpose, and without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale
... does not result in loss of the author’s common-law right to his manuscript.”).
255. The legislative history of the 1976 Act reveals some congressional awareness of the
use of copyright formalities to intentionally relinquish rights. To the extent Congress
recognized this practice, it sought to address it by reducing or eliminating opportunities for
losing copyright, intentional or not. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 151 (1976), as reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5767 (noting that the deposit requirement “resulted in many artists
choosing to forfeit copyright protection rather than bear the expense of depositing ‘two copies
of the best edition’”); see also id. at 147 (“[O]mission of notice, whether intentional or
unintentional, does not invalidate the copyright if either of two conditions is met.”).
256. See Twin Books Corp., 83 F.3d at 1165.
257. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”).
258. Id. § 405(a).
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Convention, notice is no longer required either to secure or maintain
copyright protection.259
Such a system is bound to give rise to a massive number of
unintentional, if not affirmatively unwanted, copyrights. One might
reasonably expect then that this shift from an opt-in copyright
regime—one that required some affirmative steps to secure federal
protection—to an automatic system—one that protects all eligible
works by default—would provide some mechanism for opting out of
copyright’s entitlements. But the 1976 Act is silent on whether or
how a copyright holder may dedicate their work to the public
domain or otherwise abandon their ownership interest in a work.260
Whatever the standards or procedures are for abandoning copy-
rights, they are not found in the Act itself.
B. Administrative Agnosticism
The U.S. Copyright Office, housed within the Library of Congress,
is the administrative body charged with, among other duties,
registering copyrights and recording transfers and other transac-
tions relating to copyrighted works.261 Stretching back to the late
nineteenth century, the Copyright Department, as it was then
known, has played an important role in administering the various
aspects of the copyright system.262 As copyright law has grown in-
creasingly complex, the rules, practices, and responsibilities of the
Office have expanded apace.263 The Office has not only defined rules
relating to the formal and substantive requirements for registration,
compliant notice, and sufficient deposit of copies, but it has overseen
and collected statutory licenses, and weighed in on a range of
questions of copyright policy as well.264
Beginning in 1973, the Office began to collect and publish its var-
ious policies and procedures in the Compendium of U.S. Copyright
259. Id.
260. See id. §§ 204-05 (describing the process of transferring copyright without creating
abandonment).
261. Overview of the Copyright Office, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/about/
[https://perma.cc/LT26-KJ8S].
262. Id.
263. See Aaron Perzanowski, The Limits of Copyright Office Expertise, 33 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 733, 738 (2018).
264. See id.; Overview of the Copyright Office, supra note 261.
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Office Practices.265 The most recent edition, consistent with the two
prior major revisions, addresses abandonment. The Compendium
provides that copyright holders may “record an affidavit, declara-
tion, statement, or any other document purporting to abandon a
claim to copyright or any of the exclusive rights.”266 Such a docu-
ment “should identify ... the author(s), title(s), and registration
number(s) for the works (if any).”267 It “should state that the rights
specified in the document have been abandoned.”268 Notices of
abandonment are subject to the same recordation fees that apply to
assignments or other transfers of ownership, currently $105 for a
single work.269 Crucially, however, the Copyright Office takes no
position on whether a duly recorded document that meets these
criteria and “purports” to abandon a work is effective.270 “The Office
265. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 2.3.1
(1973) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM (1973)], https://www.copyright.gov/history/comp/compend
ium-one.pdf [https://perma.cc/754Z-FAKT].
266. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 2311 (3d
ed. 2017) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM (3d ed. 2017)], https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/
compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U9R-LS8K]; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., COMPENDIUM
OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 1507.14 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM (2d
ed. 1984)], https://www.copyright.gov/history/comp/compendium-two.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9F97-FLUH] (“There is no provision in the copyright statute for abandoning a copyright or
copyright claim or any of the rights therein. However, the Copyright Office will record an
affidavit or other statement, signed by all of the copyright owners, purporting to abandon the
copyright, without expressing any opinion concerning its legal effect.”); COMPENDIUM (3d ed.
2017), supra, § 12.4.2 (“Although there is no provision in the copyright law for abandoning a
copyright, the Copyright Office will record an affidavit or signed statement of abandonment
without offering any opinion as to its legal effect.”).
267. COMPENDIUM (3d ed. 2017), supra note 266, § 2311; see also COMPENDIUM (1973),
supra note 265, § 12.4.2.
268. COMPENDIUM (3d ed. 2017), supra note 266, § 2311.
269. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CALCULATING FEES FOR RECORDING DOCUMENTS AND NOTICES
OF TERMINATION IN THE COPYRIGHT OFFICE (2014), https://www.copyright.gov/fls/sl04d.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EZM6-WXLP]. In contrast, copyright protection under the 1976 Act is
automatic and free, and optional registration costs as little as five dollars for a single work.
See Fees, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/about/fees.html [https://perma.cc/4ZLY-
99MB].
270. Section 805 of Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 refers to “public
domain computer software” and provides for the donation of copies for the Machine Readable
Collections Reading Room of the Library of Congress. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 805, 104 Stat. 5089, 5136. According to the Copyright Office, “[p]ublic
domain computer software means software which has been publicly distributed with an
explicit disclaimer of copyright protection by the copyright owner.” 37 C.F.R. § 201.26(b)(3)
(2017) (emphasis added). This suggests that, at least for software, federal law recognizes
abandonment. See STEPHEN FISHMAN, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN § 6.02, at 6-4 to
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will record an abandonment ... without offering any opinion as to
the legal effect of the document.”271 Once received, the Office creates
an online public record of the notice.272 But it does not make the
content of the notice of abandonment available online. Nor does it
cross-reference the record with the corresponding copyright
registration or maintain a database of abandoned works.273
Our search of Copyright Office records uncovered 190 notices of
abandonment filed between 1978 and 2018. On average, fewer than
five notices were recorded per year over that four-decade period. In
contrast, the Copyright Office recorded more than twenty-one
thousand assignments, licenses, and other transactions in 2018
alone, only two of which were notices of abandonment.274 For the
reasons explored below, we note an overall downward trend in
works subject to notices of abandonment. Such works peaked in
1980 at 598, dwindling to just a trickle today.275
We obtained copies of 187 of the 190 abandonment notices.276
Those documents reveal considerable variation in the rationales
offered by abandoning owners. The Office does not require copyright
owners to provide any reasons for abandoning their works,277 so the
vast majority are silent on this front. But several of the notices
volunteer information that reveals owners’ reasoning. Some
abandon copyrights in what appear to be good faith efforts to
-5 (2020).
271. COMPENDIUM (3d ed. 2017), supra note 266, § 2311.
272. Id.
273. Because the online record includes the name and registration number of only the
first work listed in a notice, those records do not fully capture even those works subject to a
notice filed with the Office. Id.
274. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL 2018, at 7 (2018), https://www.
copyright.gov/reports/annual/2018/ar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/A2AD-DSPV].
275. There were two such works in 2018; eight in 2017; and none in 2016. See U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFF., 9952 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 366 (2018); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 9953
COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 906 (2018); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 9955 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION
003 (2017); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 9947 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 100 (2017); U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF., 9947 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 107 (2017); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 9947 COPYRIGHT
RECORDATION 108 (2017); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 9952 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 942 (2017);
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 9953 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 437 (2017); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 9947
COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 109 (2017); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 9956 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION
492 (2017). All abandonment notices cited in this Article are on file with the authors.
276. Because these notices are not available online, this required a visit to the Copyright
Office archives in Washington, D.C.
277. COMPENDIUM (3d ed. 2017), supra note 266, § 2311.
2020] ABANDONING COPYRIGHT 533
acknowledge the invalidity of their copyrights. One owner filed a
notice after discovering a preexisting work,278 while another did so
upon determining that their work was ineligible for protection.279
Others seek to correct clerical errors.280 Still others abandon to
settle copyright disputes281 or to comply with court orders.282 For
example, in an antitrust case brought by a cake decoration supplier
against two larger competitors, the court ordered the defendants to
“prepare, execute and file with the Register of Copyrights notices of
abandonment of all claims to copyright in [various decorations and
related materials].”283
By contrast, some copyright holders abandon their works out of
a sense of altruism or a desire to reach a broader audience. When
Bruce MacNaul abandoned his copyrights on various legal publica-
tions, he noted his “intention that any person be able to utilize these
works and the information contained therein.”284 When Robert
Lynott abandoned the copyright in his book on weather forecasting,
he expressed his “desire ... to remove the obstacle of copyright
[because] ... [d]issemination is more important than money.”285
Other copyright holders were motivated by economic consider-
ations, in particular avoiding the manufacturing clause.286 Under
now-repealed section 601 of the 1976 Act, it was unlawful to import
or distribute copies of English language literary works unless those
copies were manufactured in the United States or Canada.287 The
manufacturing clause was nakedly protectionist, designed to in-
sulate domestic printers and publishers from low-cost international
278. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 1998 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 781 (1984).
279. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 1955 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 162 (1982).
280. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 1733 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 154 (1979); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFF., 1737 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 26 (1979).
281. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 1909 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 333 (1982); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFF., 1883 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 128 (1981).
282. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 2953 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 563 (1993); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFF., 2236 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 436 (1986).
283. Parrish's Cake Decorating Supplies, Inc. v. Wilton Enters., No. 75 C 4400, 1984 WL
2942, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1984); see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 2068 COPYRIGHT
RECORDATION 49 (1984).
284. 1955 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION, supra note 279, at 162.
285. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 2798 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 334 (1992).
286. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 2024 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 251 (1983) (explaining that
copyright in religious pamphlets was being abandoned to permit importation of materials
printed internationally).
287. 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (1988).
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competition.288 However, because it applied only to works protected
by U.S. copyright, the clause could be circumvented by abandoning
rights in a work.289
So when concern over unauthorized duplication was low, some
companies chose to forego copyright protection and print copies of
their works overseas.290 Under the regulations of the day, an
unlimited number of copies manufactured abroad could be imported
on a showing “that a statement of abandonment of copyright has
been filed and recorded in the copyright office and the notice of
copyright is completely obliterated from the works sought to be
imported.”291 For example, a company that printed hundreds of
thousands of computer manuals might be willing to part with their
copyrights if international printing offered significant cost
savings.292
In terms of the number of works abandoned, the four decade
average is about thirty-four works per year.293 From 1978 through
1986, the final year of the manufacturing clause, owners filed to
abandon an average of 110 works per year. From 1987 until 2018,
that average dropped to just over twelve works per year.294 This
suggests that the ability to manufacture and print copies interna-
tionally drove some abandonment decisions.
Finally, copyright holders employ a variety of language to convey
abandonment in the filed notices. Many simply state that they
288. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 114 (1988), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5767.
289. See 17 U.S.C. § 601(a).
290. See, e.g., 2024 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION, supra note 286, at 251.
291. Authors League of Am., Inc. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220, 221 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing 19
C.F.R. § 133.51(b)(3) (1985)).
292. Hewlett Packard, for example, abandoned its copyrights to 246 works in 1984
including various owner’s manuals and instructional materials. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 2095
COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 158, 163 (1985).
293. Although many of the notices identify a single work to be abandoned, others list
dozens or even hundreds of such works. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 3031 COPYRIGHT
RECORDATION 102 (1994); 2095 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION, supra note 292, at 158-62; U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFF., 1824 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 165, 167 (1980).
294. A similar trend is visible by examining the number of notices filed. Over forty years,
owners filed an average of 4.6 notices each year. In the manufacturing clause era, that
average was nearly seven notices per year. In the years that followed, the average dropped
to fewer than four notices annually. Two outlier years in which the same copyright holder
filed separate notices for multiple works drove the number higher.
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“hereby abandon” a particular work.295 Others express their intent
to “abandon, surrender and disclaim all right, title and interest in
and to the ... work”296 or “irrevocably surrender, relinquish, aban-
don, dedicate to the public and inject into the public domain any and
all copyrights”297 or “irrevocably ... relinquish and abandon [their]
Registrations and the claims described therein.”298 Each of these
phrasings seem to establish unambiguously the copyright holder’s
intent to abandon their work. As the next Section demonstrates,
courts have struggled to define and apply a precise standard for
abandonment.
C. Judicial Uncertainty
Given the absence of any explicit or reliable statutory or adminis-
trative mechanism for abandoning copyrights, courts facing claims
of copyright abandonment have borrowed from the law of personal
property. In both contexts, abandonment is the intentional relin-
quishment of a legal interest as manifested by some overt act.299 But
the abandonment of rights in intangible works is, at best, an
imperfect analog to the abandonment of physical assets.
To more fully understand how courts conceptualize, interpret, and
apply the doctrine of abandonment in the copyright context, we have
identified and analyzed what we believe is every state and federal
opinion containing a substantive analysis of what courts term
copyright “abandonment.” In all, that dataset includes 293 deci-
sions.300 The earliest dates from 1834, and the most recent were
295. See, e.g., 2024 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION, supra note 286, at 251.
296. 3031 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION, supra note 293, at 102.
297. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 3426 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 811 (1999).
298. U.S.COPYRIGHT OFF., 3620 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 415 (2012). One distinction that
emerges from the notices is that between the intent to abandon a work and the intent to
abandon a registration. Often the work and registration are referred to interchangeably, or
they are abandoned in tandem. In some instances, copyright holders claim to abandon a
registration while reserving rights in the underlying work. See, e.g., 9952 COPYRIGHT
RECORDATION, supra note 275, at 366; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 3596 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION
345 (2010); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., 3422 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 930 (1999); U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF., 2784 COPYRIGHT RECORDATION 462 (1992) (insisting that abandonment of registration
“in no way constitutes an abandonment of the work”).
299. See infra notes 325-28 and accompanying text.
300. We identified these by searching Westlaw for “copyright /5 abandon!” That search
yielded 437 cases. We then manually reviewed the results and removed more than one
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decided in 2019. Of these 293 decisions, however, 131 exclusively
address questions of copyright forfeiture, rather than abandonment
proper. Of the remaining 162 decisions that squarely address
abandonment, only seventeen found that the works in question had,
in fact, been abandoned. In addition, we identified a handful of
decisions that, while not containing the term “abandonment,”
nonetheless offer analyses that track the doctrine that emerges from
the cases.
Our examination of these decisions suggests that, not unlike their
chattel property counterparts, the copyright abandonment cases
reveal considerable confusion, uncertainty, and inconsistency. First,
courts have failed to reliably distinguish between abandonment
and a number of related, but conceptually and practically distinct
doctrines. In part, this confusion reflects the extent to which aban-
donment was doctrinally intertwined with the formalities that
prevailed in copyright law prior to the 1976 Act. Since then, courts
have delineated some of these doctrines more clearly. Others remain
muddled. Second, aside from the bare recitation of the common law
test for abandonment, a fully realized and consistently applied
doctrine has yet to take shape. Given the paucity of cases in which
abandonment defenses prevail, it remains difficult to predict with
much confidence which acts courts will deem sufficient evidence of
the subjective intent to abandon.
Both the doctrinal conflation and the absence of guidance as to
divining intent obscure the path to effective abandonment. That fact
frustrates rights holders contemplating abandonment, introduces
uncertainty for users of plausibly abandoned works, and leaves
courts poorly equipped to resolve disputes between them.
1. Distinguishing Adjacent Doctrines
Before we examine how courts have resolved genuine cases of
alleged abandonment, it is necessary to distinguish abandonment
from a cluster of related doctrines. This clarification is important
because courts are often imprecise in their terminology. That
imprecision obfuscates the contours of abandonment. For instance,
hundred false positives. Those included decisions that made passing references to “aban-
donment” and those that involved abandonment of noncopyright interests.
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courts frequently refer to “abandonment” when cases actually
present a question of forfeiture.301 At other times, courts blur the
line between abandonment and a number of related, but distinct
doctrines including acquiescence, waiver, estoppel, and implied
license.302 So before explaining what abandonment is, we begin by
explaining what it is not.
Copyright abandonment—the intentional relinquishing of rights
in a work as manifested through some overt act—is closely related
to forfeiture—the unintentional loss of copyright due to a failure to
comply with some formal requirement.303 Most commonly, forfeiture
occurs when a would-be copyright holder engages in a general
publication without proper notice of copyright.304
Abandonment and forfeiture are different in crucial respects,
however. Abandonment requires the owner’s intent to give up their
exclusive rights in the work, while forfeiture divests the copyright
holder by operation of law irrespective of their intent.305 Courts
frequently use these terms interchangeably, referring to “abandon-
ment” when the case actually involves forfeiture.306 This mistake is
understandable given that, under the pre-1976 regime, works could
be abandoned by publication without notice—the very same act that
constituted the bulk of forfeiture cases.307 But the two doctrines are
not equivalent. An author who tries but fails to provide proper
notice may forfeit their copyright, but the absence of such notice
alone does not establish an intent to abandon.308 Conversely, an
author who makes a limited, as opposed to general, publication does
not automatically forfeit copyright, but they may have abandoned
it if intent can be established.309
301. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 306 and accompanying text.
302. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
303. 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:155 (2020).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Bentley v. Tibbals, 223 F. 247, 250-51, 257 (2d Cir. 1915); Koppel v. Downing,
11 App. D.C. 93, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1897); Atl. Monthly Co. v. Post Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 556, 559 (D.
Mass. 1928).
307. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
308. Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 597-98 (2d Cir. 1951).
309. Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp. 1241, 1249 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (“[L]imited
distribution, even if not widespread enough to effect a forfeiture, can, coupled with the
requisite intent, cause an abandonment.”).
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Related to the conflation of abandonment and forfeiture is the
tendency to treat both doctrines as synonymous with dedication to
the public domain.310 Public domain status is best understood as the
legal consequence of both abandonment and forfeiture. While the
term “dedication” implies some degree of intent, courts often refer
to forfeiture as a public domain dedication.311 In any case, dedication
is not a distinct doctrine with its own legal standard. Notably,
copyrights in certain foreign works that were in the public domain
were restored by the Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act in 1996 if
they were forfeited, but not if they were abandoned.312
Courts also confuse abandonment and waiver.313 The two
doctrines share some similarities. Both are concerned with a rights
holder’s intent, evidenced by some overt act, to cede some measure
of control over a work.314 While abandonment works a full relin-
quishment of copyright against all users of the work, waiver is more
narrowly tailored: it limits the copyright holder’s rights only as to
the particular party to whom the intent was communicated.315
Moreover, while waiver can be partial, applying only to some rights
310. See, e.g., Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int’l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 484-86, 484 n.6
(5th Cir. 1981) (equating abandonment with dedication); Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763, 764-
66 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1,580); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 426 F. Supp. 690,
695 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (equating failure to renew with abandonment and dedication).
311. See, e.g., Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 945-46 (2d Cir. 1975);
Boucicault v. Fox, 3 F. Cas. 977, 980-81 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 1,691); Pub. Affs. Assocs.,
Inc., v. Rickover, 177 F. Supp. 601, 606 (D.D.C. 1959); RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 28 F. Supp.
787, 792-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Holmes v. Hurst, 76 F. 757, 758 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1896).
312. 17 U.S.C. § 104A; see Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 552,
560 (3d Cir. 2002).
313. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001);
Bubble Pony, Inc. v. Facepunch Studios Ltd., No. CV 15-601(DSD/FLN), 2017 WL 1379326,
at *3 (D. Minn. Apr. 14, 2017); Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., No.
C 93-20079 JW, 1995 WL 836331, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1995). But see Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471, 482-84 (2d Cir. 2004) (providing distinct analyses of
waiver and abandonment).
314. See, e.g., Bell v. Moawad Grp., LLC, 326 F. Supp. 3d 918, 929 (D. Ariz. 2018). But see
Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l Inc., 241 F.3d 398, 409 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Copyright also may
be waived as the result of a particular act, even if waiver was not the intended result.”).
Notably the case cited in Veeck for this proposition, Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little,
concerning the question of forfeiture, demonstrates that waiver is confused with forfeiture
as well. 51 F.3d 45, 48 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[B]y failing to adhere to the statutory formalities—
i.e., the copyright notice requirement—the Littles forfeited whatever copyrights they claim
to have had in the ribbon flowers.”).
315. See Capitol Records, Inc., 372 F.3d at 482-83; PATRY, supra note 303, § 5:157.
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enjoyed by the copyright holder, most authorities agree that
abandonment implicates all of the copyright holder’s rights.316
Estoppel and acquiescence compound the problem. As the
Supreme Court recently clarified, estoppel applies “when a copy-
right owner engages in intentionally misleading representations
concerning his abstention from suit, and the alleged infringer
detrimentally relies on the copyright owner's deception.”317 Acquies-
cence is best understood as a type of estoppel. It turns on express or
implied assurances made by the copyright holder to the defendant
that it will not assert its copyright.318 This focus on reliance
distinguishes estoppel and acquiescence from abandonment. Like
waiver, even if estoppel or acquiescence can be established, the
copyright holder retains ownership and the ability to enforce its
copyright against the rest of the world.319 Nonetheless, courts have
sometimes failed to clearly delineate these doctrines.320
Finally, courts have even confused abandonment with implied
license.321 An implied license is created when the conduct of two
parties and the surrounding circumstances “demonstrate that the
parties intended that the work would be used for a specific
316. See infra note 396 and accompanying text; see also PATRY, supra note 303, § 5:157
(“Waiver, properly construed, refers only to a decision not to enforce rights against a
particular party and may be contrasted with abandonment, which concerns a decision to
relinquish all (or arguably some) rights in the work as against the world.”).
317. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 684-85 (2014).
318. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 936 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 1991).
319. See PATRY, supra note 303, § 5:157.
320. See, e.g., Am. Metro. Enters. of N.Y., Inc. v. Warner Bros., Inc. Records, 389 F.2d 903,
905 (2d Cir. 1968) (failing to distinguish abandonment and acquiescence); Coach, Inc. v.
Kmart Corps., 756 F. Supp. 2d 421, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (failing to distinguish abandonment
and acquiescence); Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc. v. Hitachi Data Sys. Corp., No. C 93-20079
JW, 1995 WL 836331, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1995) (failing to distinguish abandonment,
waiver, and acquiescence); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522,
1539-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing estoppel, abandonment, and acquiescence without
articulating the differences between them).
321. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 647-48
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“MP3tunes contends that by offering a promotional download from an
authorized website, Plaintiffs either abandoned their copyrights altogether or authorized
downloads outside of the promotional context. In either event, MP3tunes has the burden to
prove the existence of such a broad implied license.”); Microstar v. Formgen Inc., 942 F. Supp.
1312, 1317-18 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that Microstar “contends it has an implied license to
use the screen scenes and screen saver images in any way that it chooses. The gravamen of
this argument is that by encouraging users of Duke 3D to create new levels and share them
with the world, movants in effect granted an open license to use any copyrighted material,
such that they have waived or abandoned any claim to copyright protection”).
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purpose.”322 The right to engage in a particular use established
through a context-sensitive examination of the interactions between
two parties is a far cry from the sweeping loss of copyright entailed
by abandonment. Moreover, implied licenses are generally revoca-
ble.323 Abandonment, by contrast, is forever.
As the discussion above makes clear, courts have frequently failed
to accurately distinguish abandonment, its elements, and its
consequences from other related doctrines.324 Having shown what
abandonment is not, we now try to outline as clearly as possible
what abandonment is and what evidence courts have deemed
sufficient to establish it.
2. The Unsettled Black Letter Law of Abandonment
Most courts agree that copyright abandonment requires an intent
to relinquish rights in a work, as manifested by some overt act by
the rights holder.325 The prevailing view is that mere inaction in the
face of unauthorized use is insufficient,326 but some courts have
suggested otherwise.327 This test mirrors the one applied in chattel
property abandonment cases, from which it was borrowed.328
322. PATRY, supra note 303, § 5:131; see also Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555,
558-59 (9th Cir. 1990).
323. See PATRY, supra note 303, § 5:131 (noting that implied licenses require intent, which
can be revoked).
324. See Armstrong, supra note 17, at 391-92.
325. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 372 F.3d 471, 483 (2d Cir. 2004);
Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998); Hampton v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir. 1960); Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett
Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 598 (2d Cir. 1951). But courts still occasionally articulate other
standards. See, e.g., Bell v. Moawad Grp., LLC, 326 F. Supp. 3d 918, 929 (D. Ariz. 2018)
(“[W]aiver or abandonment of copyright ‘occurs only if there is an intent by the copyright
proprietor to surrender rights in his work.’” (alteration in original) (quoting A&M Records v.
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001))); Basic Books, Inc., 758 F. Supp. at 1540
(“The plaintiff 's acquiescence in the defendant's infringing acts may, if continued for a
sufficient period of time and if manifested by overt acts, result in an abandonment of
copyright.”).
326. See, e.g., Hampton, 279 F.2d at 104; Dodd, Mead & Co. v. Lilienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105,
108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
327. See, e.g., Dam Things from Den. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“[T]here must be either an act, or a failure to act, from which we can readily infer an intent
to abandon the right.”).
328. See, e.g., Griffis v. Davidson Cnty. Metro. Gov't, 164 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Tenn. 2005) (“[A]
complainant ... must show both intent to abandon for the stated limitations and some external
2020] ABANDONING COPYRIGHT 541
Despite the general consensus with respect to the appropriate test,
the abandonment decisions reveal that courts struggle to draw
consistent and predictable lines, leaving copyright holders uncertain
about how to abandon their works and potential users guessing
about their copyright status.
As we detail below, courts have confronted—and occasionally
accepted—a range of overt acts as proof of the intent to abandon a
copyright.329 Those acts tend to sort themselves into two categories.
On the one hand, we have explicit notices or statements disclaim-
ing copyright.330 On the other, we find a range of ambiguous be-
haviors that are open to diverging interpretations.331 The outcomes
in these cases provide little guidance to future litigants. Even de-
cisions addressing explicit verbal disclaimers—what should be the
most straightforward cases—fail to yield a single, consistent stan-
dard. Cases addressing more ambiguous conduct offer even less
certainty.
a. Verbal Disclaimers
A number of courts have considered whether oral or written
statements that purport to disclaim copyright amount to abandon-
ment. For the most explicit statements, courts have generally found
that abandonment has occurred. But because abandonment turns
on the subjective intent of the rights holder, even verbal communi-
cations are often open to competing interpretations. In some
instances, we identified courts that were too eager to find abandon-
ment. Others were reluctant to deem a work abandoned despite
what we believe is clear evidence of intent.
Bates v. Keirsey presents an easy case of abandonment.332 The
authors and copyright holders of the book Please Understand Me
wanted to import copies from Hong Kong.333 In order to avoid the
manufacturing clause, Bates and Keirsey signed a document
entitled “Abandonment of Copyright” that read, in part, “We hereby
act or omission by which the intent to abandon is effectuated.”).
329. See infra Part III.C.2.a-b.
330. See, e.g., infra notes 340-42 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., infra notes 343-46 and accompanying text.
332. No. D041368, 2004 WL 2850153 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2004).
333. Id. at *1-2.
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abandon our copyright to the book titled Please Understand Me.”334
The court was convinced that the “evidence unequivocally estab-
lishe[d]” that Bates engaged in an overt act demonstrating his
intent to abandon.335
Likewise, the court dismissed Carol Highsmith’s claims when she
sued Getty Images for falsifying copyright information.336 The stock
photo firm charged for licenses to use photos that Highsmith made
freely available through the Library of Congress.337 Claims under
§ 1202 require an “intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal
infringement.”338 As part of her gift to the Library, Highsmith
“dedicate[d] to the public all rights, including copyrights throughout
the world ... in this collection.”339 As a result, the works were in the
public domain, and infringement was impossible.
In Hadady Corp. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the publisher of
a newsletter included the following statement in its copyright
notice: “The information contained in this letter is protected by U.S.
copyright laws through noon EST on the 2d day after its release.”340
Hadady denied that this statement expressed an intent to abandon,
a contention the court concluded “fl[ew] in the face of the only
possible meaning” of the notice.341 As in Bates and Highsmith, the
court found abandonment on the basis of an unambiguous state-
ment offered freely by the copyright holder.342
334. Id. at *8.
335. See We Shall Overcome Found. v. Richmond Org., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 3d 960, 966
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (requiring as part of settlement that copyright holders “agree[d] that
hereafter they will not claim copyright in the melody or lyrics of any verse of the song We
Shall Overcome” (alteration in original)); J2F Prods., Inc. v. Sarrow, No. CV 09-7000-JST
(FFM), 2011 WL 13185746, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011) (holding that counterclaimant
explicitly abandoned copyright via written notice of abandonment); Capitol Records, Inc. v.
Naxos of Am., Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 472, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding abandonment after
copyright holder “confirmed that a third party ‘was wrong in believing’ he needed a letter of
authorization ... before he could copy a recording ‘when the recording in question is public
domain’”).
336. Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, Highsmith v. Getty Images, Inc., No. 16 CIV
5924-JJR (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2016).
337. First Amended Complaint, supra note 105, at 2.
338. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a).
339. First Amended Complaint, Exhibit I, supra note 105.
340. 739 F. Supp. 1392, 1396 (C.D. Cal. 1990).
341. Id. at 1399.
342. Id.
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Not all statements offer such clear evidence of intent. For exam-
ple, architect Paul Oravec entered building plans in a competition
to design the new World Trade Center.343 As a condition for entering
that competition, Oravec signed a letter “signifying [his] agreement
that [he] reserve[d] no patent, trademark, copyright, trade secret or
other intellectual property rights in any of the material that forms
or is contained in [his] proposal.”344 This language is at best ambig-
uous. It could be read to effectuate a broad abandonment, but is
more plausibly understood in context to effectuate a waiver of rights
that extended only to the entity running the contest, the coun-
terparty in the agreement. Oravec did not win the contest, but his
designs were allegedly copied by the Florida developers of the
Trump Palace and Trump Royale.345 When he sued for infringement,
the court held he had abandoned his copyright interests by virtue of
his agreement to the contest rules.346
Similarly, in Wyatt Technology Corp. v. Malvern Instruments Inc.,
the predecessor in interest of the copyright holder distributed a
software program with a notice that read: “Currently, there are no
restrictions on this material. You may install it on as many PC
systems as you like, and you may distribute it freely to your
colleagues.”347 The term “currently” would seem to preclude reading
the language as expressing an intent to abandon. Instead, it appears
to reserve a right to alter these permissive terms at a later date.
Despite a witness who testified that the developer “never intended
to ‘abandon’” its rights, the court determined the notice indicated an
intent to abandon.348
In other instances, however, courts have declined to find aban-
donment despite seemingly clear statements by rights holders.
343. Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1153-54 (S.D. Fla.
2006).
344. Id. at 1154 (alterations in original).
345. Id. at 1151.
346. Id. at 1177-78.
347. No. CV 07-08298 DDP(MANx), 2009 WL 2365647, at *12 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2009).
348. Id.; see also Rouse v. Walter & Assocs., L.L.C., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1069-70 (S.D.
Iowa 2007) (finding abandonment when software was created with a tool that prohibited
privately owned software, when copyright notices mentioned plaintiffs’ employer, when
plaintiffs signed an agreement that referred to the program as plaintiffs’ employer’s property,
and when plaintiffs claimed in a published article that the program was owned by plaintiffs’
employer).
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Melchizedek v. Holt concerned the copyright in a meditation video.349
In an open letter, the creator of the video explained that he “let the
video go out to the world unrestrained. No control on the copy-
righted material. No money coming back to me from the videos.”350
He went on to explain that he “never cared about the copyrights
[and] wanted the information to go out to the world.”351 Later, he
told workshop attendees that he “do[es]n't care about copyrights or
any of that stuff, that doesn't matter.”352 Nonetheless, the court
found the evidence insufficient to establish abandonment.353
As these cases demonstrate, even when copyright holders offer
oral or written disclaimers of their rights, it is often difficult to
predict whether a court will find abandonment has occurred.354
b. Other Overt Acts
The overt act requirement may also be satisfied by conduct rather
than language. Defendants often point to some nonverbal act of the
owner that arguably expresses a desire to abandon a copyright.
These purported defenses are often implausible and sometimes
border on the frivolous.355 Defendants have insisted copyrights were
abandoned when a book went out of print,356 software was desig-
nated open source,357 images were uploaded to Wikipedia under a
349. 792 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (D. Ariz. 2011).
350. Id. at 1048.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 1058 (denying a motion for a summary judgment on abandonment grounds).
354. This lack of a clear standard may explain in part the current posture of the Furie case.
The creator of Pepe the Frog made a number of statements that could only tepidly be
understood to indicate abandonment, such as “I believe in supporting people’s decisions to
profit off of Pepe.” Furie v. Infowars, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 952, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2019). Rather
than resolving the issue as a matter of law, though, the court simply punted the case to a jury,
holding that the statements did not clearly indicate intent to abandon (or its absence). Id. at
966-67.
355. See, e.g., Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., No. 6:02-cv-1377-Orl-19KRS, 2004 WL 5486639,
at *15 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 12, 2004) (arguing that the defendant’s possession of a painting
indicates abandonment of copyright); Covington Indus. Inc. v. Nichols, No. 02 Civ. 8037(KTD),
2004 WL 784825, at *2, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2004) (arguing that copyright was abandoned
when a company failed to respond after it received notice of their fabric being copied).
356. Dodd, Mead & Co. v. Lilienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
357. Blizzard Ent., Inc. v. Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co., No. 3:15-cv-04084-CRB, 2017 WL
2118342, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2017).
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CC license,358 works were shared on the internet,359 and a program
was broadcast on public television.360 These claims are all substan-
tively implausible because they confuse an owner’s making a work
accessible to the public on a limited basis with wholesale relinquish-
ment of control over the work. Courts are generally capable of
recognizing and rejecting these grasping efforts to establish
abandonment, but other conduct has resulted in less obvious
determinations.
Two cases illustrate the conceptual difficulty courts sometimes
face in applying a doctrine developed in the context of chattels to
intangible works. When it comes to chattels, the physical disposition
of the property often offers strong indications of intent. A couch
placed unattended on the sidewalk is a reasonably clear sign of the
owner’s intent to abandon it. Under copyright law, ownership of any
physical embodiment of a work is distinct from ownership of the
copyright in the intangible work.361 This creates inevitable doctrinal
tension as an owner’s actions and intent with respect to copies may
not carry over to the work embodied in those copies.
Pushman v. New York Graphic Society epitomizes this tension.362
The plaintiff sold the defendant an original painting and sued for
infringement after it created reproductions.363 The court found that:
the absolute sale and delivery of the painting without any
condition, reservation or qualification of any kind, to a state-
owned public institution where it has been displayed for a long
period of time, constitute an abandonment of all the plaintiff 's
rights and a publication and dedication to public use free for
enjoyment and reproduction by anybody.364
358. Philpot v. World Pub. Libr. Ass’n, No. 18-00057 DKW-RLP, 2018 WL 3422777, at *2
(D. Haw. June 25, 2018).
359. Dolores Press, Inc. v. Robinson, 766 F. App’x 449, 455 (9th Cir. 2019); Rosen v. Martin,
No. CV 12-0657 ABC (FMOx), 2012 WL 12845103, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2012).
360. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1158 (W.D.N.Y.
1982).
361. 17 U.S.C. § 202. But see Pushman v. N.Y. Graphic Soc’y, Inc., 25 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33-34
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) (holding that transfer of a copy can convey copyright as well).
362. 25 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 34. But see Patterson v. J. S. Ogilvie Pub. Co., 119 F. 451, 453 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1902) (finding no abandonment after the sale of printing plates because “[t]hey were mere
pieces of metal, which became the property of the purchaser, but gave him no right to publish
the copyrighted work which could be printed from them”).
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The court treated the owner’s relinquishment of control over the
copy—the painted canvas—as expressing relinquishment of con-
trol over the work—the abstract image embodied in the painting.365
This conflation of the copy with the work has been abrogated by
the 1976 Copyright Act.366
Likewise, in Pacific and Southern Co. v. Duncan, the court in-
terpreted the destruction of a videotape recording as a demonstra-
tion of the rights holder’s intent to abandon its copyright.367 There,
a television station sued a television monitoring service that re-
corded and sold a copy of a segment from the station’s news broad-
cast.368 Although the station retained copies of pretaped segments,
it generally destroyed all copies of its news programs soon after they
were broadcast.369 According to the court, the station’s “destruction
of its broadcast videotapes is certainly” an overt act that “evidences
an intention to abandon [its] copyright.”370 Here, too, the court
inferred from an owner’s destructive act with respect to a copy that
they had an intent to abandon the work embodied in that copy.371
Without additional evidence of intent, this inference is untenable.
The station may have deleted the tape for a number of reasons. It
may have lacked the space necessary to archive every broadcast, for
example. Certainly, nothing about its private archiving practices
communicated to the defendant its intent to abandon.
In other cases, despite the generally agreed upon rule that fail-
ures to act are insufficient to show abandonment,372 some courts
have made questionable inferences on the basis of rights holders’ si-
lence. One court held that an author’s failure to object when a psy-
chiatrist sent thousands of copies of a poem to his patients resulted
in abandonment.373 Another found that the failure to object to
publication of a song and its widespread use for decades effectuated
365. Pushman, 25 N.Y.S. 2d at 34.
366. See 17 U.S.C. § 201; Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Reconciling Intellectual &
Personal Property, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1211, 1222-23 (2015).
367. 572 F. Supp. 1186, 1196 (N.D. Ga. 1983).
368. Id. at 1189.
369. Id. at 1189, 1196.
370. Id. at 1196.
371. Id.
372. Cf. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1545-46 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (articulating
a rule that mere nonuse of real property, without more, does not constitute abandonment).
373. Bell v. Combined Registry Co., 397 F. Supp. 1241, 1247 (N.D. Ill. 1975). In addition,
the author described the poem as a gift to the world in his diary. Id.
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an abandonment.374 A third found abandonment at least in part on
the basis of the copyright holder discontinuing publication of its
magazine.375 These cases seem to disregard the overt act require-
ment entirely, mistaking an owner’s inaction with respect to their
copyright for an affirmative intent to place it into the public do-
main.376
Even when copyright holders do engage in some overt act that
could be construed as abandoning the work, courts are prone to
overstating their intent. In Seshadri v. Kasraian, the Seventh
Circuit considered a claim of infringement brought by a professor
against a former graduate student who published a research paper
solely under his own name.377 Having concluded that the two were
joint authors, the court had no need to resolve the question of
abandonment.378 Nonetheless, Judge Posner asserted that
[h]ad Seshadri authorized Kasraian or the Journal of Applied
Physics to publish the article under Kasraian's sole name, that
would be abandonment—a statement or other act that demon-
strates an intention of relinquishing any copyright interest in a
work.... Authorizing another to publish under his sole name
would amount to a public disclaimer of authorship.379
Posner’s dictum represents a different kind of conflation, confusing
attribution and abandonment. The former is about credit; the latter
is about relinquishing copyright.380 One can seek the latter while
forgoing the former.
374. Egner v. E.C. Schirmer Music Co., 48 F. Supp. 187, 188-90 (D. Mass. 1942); see Stuff
v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 342 F.2d 143, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1965). Although Stuff does not use the
term “abandonment,” the court concluded that the work was dedicated to the public domain,
in part, because the copyright holder was “derelict” in preventing infringing uses. Id.
375. Pearson v. Washingtonian Publ’g Co., 98 F.2d 245, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1938), decree rev’d,
306 U.S. 30 (1939) (addressing only the question of forfeiture).
376. Copyright, unlike trademark and trade secret law, imposes no obligation to use a work
in order to establish or maintain protection. See Hrdy & Lemley, supra note 57, at 9.
377. 130 F.3d 798, 799-801 (7th Cir. 1997).
378. Id. at 803-05 (finding that as joint authors, both parties were entitled to license
reproduction of the article on a nonexclusive basis, subject only to an obligation to account the
other coauthor for any revenue generated).
379. Id. at 805 (citations omitted).
380. Compare 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 56, § 8D.03, with PATRY, supra note 303,
§ 5:155.
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Some defendants have argued that owners who file works with
public agencies have abandoned their copyrights, but courts have
rightly tended to disagree.381 For example, an architect who
submitted plans in order to secure a building permit did not intend
to abandon copyright in the design.382 One potential exception to
this general rule is presented in Korzybski v. Underwood &
Underwood.383 There the plaintiff sued for infringement of his
“model ... illustrating thought processes and formulating scientific
information ... consisting of pieces of various shapes of geometric
design, containing numerous holes and connected by strings
attached to pegs.”384 Crucially, the model embodied the invention
described in Korzybski’s patent for an “Educational Appliance.”385
As a result, the Second Circuit deemed the copyright invalid.386
On one reading of the case, Korzybski engaged in general pub-
lication of his design when he submitted his application to the
Patent Office.387 Presumably, that publication failed to comply with
the formal requirements of the federal copyright protection, al-
though the court was silent on that question. Although the court did
not invoke the term “abandonment,” we think the better reading
focuses on Korzybski’s intentional relinquishment of rights in light
of the disclosure requirements of patent law. As the court explain-
ed, “When Korzybski filed his application and received his patent,
he made a full disclosure of his invention and dedicated it to the
381. Blunt v. Patten, 3 F. Cas. 762, 763 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1,579) (“[T]he pretence
that it became a public document from being deposited in the public office, was entirely
untenable.”). One case sometimes cited as an example of abandonment is Heine v. Appleton.
11 F. Cas. 1031, 1032 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1857) (No. 6,324). There, an artist on Commodore Perry's
naval mission to Japan was deemed a government employee whose work was in the public
domain by virtue of that fact. Id. at 1033. But we think the case is better understood as one
denying copyright to federal government works. See PATRY, supra note 303, § 4:57 (describing
Heine as a case about government works). But see FISHMAN, supra note 270, § 6.02 (describing
Heine as an abandonment case).
382. Smith v. Paul, 345 P.2d 546, 550-51 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (depositing chart with
the Navy building department did not commit it to the public domain).
383. 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929).
384. Id. at 728.
385. U.S. Patent No. 1,539,194.
386. Korzybski, 36 F.2d at 729.
387. Id. (“The filing of the application for the patent, including, of course, the diagrams,
was a publication that entitled anyone to copy the drawings.”).
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public, save for the right to make, use, and vend it during the period
for which the patent gave him that monopoly.”388
These cases illustrate that it is usually difficult to reasonably
draw an inference about an author’s intent with respect to the work
by examining their behavior with respect to the copy in which that
work is embodied. Thus, outside of circumstances in which filing,
disclosing, or publishing a work is inconsistent with copyright
protection as a matter of established law—as in Korzybski—we
argue that courts should not treat nonverbal conduct as evidence of
abandonment. As all of these cases illustrate, the disposition of
copies is rarely indicative of the copyright holder’s intent with
respect to the underlying work. Moreover, because copyright law
grants rights holders wide latitude to license their works, even
impliedly, it is difficult to distinguish contingent permission to use
a work from a relinquishment of rights. Given the permanent
consequences of abandonment, courts should maintain a high bar
for evidence of intent.389 Insisting on verbal expressions of abandon-
ment is the best way to simultaneously facilitate abandonment
when it is intended and to avoid it when it is not.
c. Partial Abandonment
Courts are divided over the question of whether an owner can
abandon some, but not all, of their interest in a work, adding to
the uncertainty surrounding abandonment. Conceptually, this ques-
tion is not unique to copyright abandonment. We could imagine, for
example, an owner who abandons the right to sit on an old couch,
but not the right to sleep on it, or parts with napping rights on
weekends, but not weekdays. The law is generally hostile to those
388. Id. Regardless of the appropriate reading of Korzybski, we think it unlikely that courts
today would deem copyrightable material abandoned purely by virtue of its inclusion in a
patent application or an issued patent. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected the
doctrine of election, which required applicants to choose between design patent and copyright
protection. In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Courts have generally grown
accustomed to overlapping intellectual property protections. See Christopher Buccafusco,
Mark A. Lemley & Jonathan S. Masur, Intelligent Design, 68 DUKE L.J. 75, 128-30 (2018)
(criticizing this trend).
389. See Armstrong, supra note 17, at 395 (“Judicial reluctance to impose such severe
consequences, absent the most unequivocal indication that such was the author's intent, may
do much to explain the comparative scarcity of cases finding abandonment of copyright.”).
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sorts of servitudes on chattels even if they could be enforced as a
practical matter.390 While contract law could accommodate such
arrangements, the law of property generally, and abandonment in
particular, are tools poorly suited for the job.
Unlike ownership of chattels, copyright interests are infinitely
divisible. This distinction is a function of both their intangible
nature and an explicit policy choice reflected in the Copyright Act.391
Copyright interests are routinely divided and subdivided—some
times resulting in onionskin-thin rights. One party may hold an
exclusive license to publish a book, with another party holding the
rights to film adaptations, and yet another controlling French
translation rights. Each of those rights can be further limited by
geographical scope and duration. So long as these licenses are
exclusive, the Copyright Act regards them as ownership interests in
the underlying work.392
Given this power to configure tailor-made alienable copyright
interests, some courts have suggested that a copyright holder may
partially abandon its interest.393 In dicta in Micro Star v. FormGen,
Inc., for example, Judge Kozinski thought it possible that a video
game developer could abandon the rights to create and freely
distribute derivative works, while retaining the right to commer-
cially distribute the same.394
390. See Christina Mulligan, A Numerus Clausus Principle for Intellectual Property, 80
TENN.L.REV. 235, 241-42 (2013); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO.
L.J. 885, 907-10 (2008).
391. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d).
392. Id.
393. We located a single case, decided by the New Jersey Chancery Court in 1888, that
actually found a work was partially abandoned. Aronson v. Baker, 12 A. 177, 180 (N.J. Ch.
1888) (“This question is an open one in this state; it never before having been presented for
judicial consideration in this state.... The rule which I think should be adopted may be stated
as follows: That the owner of a dramatic or musical composition may, like the owner of any
other kind of property, do with his own as he pleases; he may retain it for his own use and
benefit, or he may give it to the public out and out, or he may make a limited or partial
dedication of it.”). Aronson has been cited for this proposition once, in a dissent. See Kurlan
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 256 F.2d 962, 974 (Cal. 1953) (Carter, J., dissenting).
394. 154 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Given that it overtly encouraged players to make
and freely distribute new levels, FormGen may indeed have abandoned its exclusive right to
do the same. But abandoning some rights is not the same as abandoning all rights, and
FormGen never overtly abandoned its rights to profit commercially from new levels.”); see also
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 381 F. Supp. 3d 343, 353 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (citing Columbia
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 1986)) (leaving open the possibility
of abandonment of rights to reproduce and distribute videos uploaded to tubesites in a case
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Other authority, however, treats the question of abandonment as
an all-or-nothing proposition, consistent with the doctrine’s appli-
cation to chattel property. As the Southern District of New York
wrote when a publisher alleged that Paramount had partially
abandoned its rights in Star Trek: “Defendants invite the Court to
boldly go where no court has gone before and recognize the doctrine
of limited abandonment. The Court declines the invitation.... ‘[n]o
pertinent authority has been cited for the proposition [of limited
abandonment] and the Court knows of none.’”395
Despite copyright’s generally permissive approach to the divisibil-
ity and alienability of copyright interests, the binary approach
better serves the aims of the abandonment doctrine. This approach
to abandonment provides a simple and clear set of rights to
potential users. A work is either abandoned, in which case all may
use it, or it is not, in which case use requires permission, absent
some other applicable doctrine or defense. Partial abandonment
would inevitably result in disputes over the precise scope of the
rights abandoned, increasing information costs and setting poten-
tial traps for unwary users.396 Abandonment should be reserved for
scenarios in which a rights holder intends to relinquish the entirety
of the statutory rights in a given work.397 Efforts to grant other
forms of permission to the public should be construed as licenses.
about waiver and first sale); Taylor Holland LLC v. MVMT Watches Inc., No. 2:15-cv-03578-
SVW-JC, 2016 WL 6892097, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2016) (dictum) (citing Micro Star, 154
F.3d at 1114).
395. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (alterations in original) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop.
Prods., Inc., No. C79-1766, 1981 WL 1380, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3, 1981)), aff'd, 181 F.3d 83
(2d Cir. 1999).
396. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 32, at 485-86; Mulligan, supra note 390, at 243-44.
397. Abandonment of jointly authored or otherwise co-owned works presents a potential
complication. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“[A]uthors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in
the work.”). In the event one co-owner indicates her intent to abandon a work but the other
does not, the nonabandoning owner should be considered the sole remaining owner.
Abandonment is an exercise in destroying one’s legal rights, an option each co-owner is free
to exercise. See supra Part I.B. and text accompanying note 172. While one co-owner may
destroy their own legal interest, they cannot destroy the interests of other co-owners. See 17
U.S.C. § 201 (noting that co-owners have independent rights to the joint work). Even if we
consider abandonment as a transfer to the public, it is not one that a joint owner can make
unilaterally. See Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that a joint author
cannot transfer all interest in the work without the other co-owner's express authorization).
552 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:487
As this Part has highlighted, the statements and behaviors
alleged to establish an intent to abandon are manifold, and the
courts’ conclusions are sometimes inconsistent and counterintuitive.
One reasonably certain lesson we can draw from these cases is that
when a document expressly memorializes the copyright holder’s
intent to relinquish their rights, courts will acknowledge copyright
abandonment.398 Given the irrevocable nature of abandonment and
the risks it can present for copyright holders,399 we believe that a
reasonably high threshold is appropriate. But, as the next Part
explains, it is crucial that rights holders who do choose to abandon
their works can avail themselves of a clear, effective, low-cost mech-
anism for abandonment. Just as importantly, in order to achieve the
socially desirable level of abandonment, rights holders need to
understand that abandoning their works is an option, and the law
must provide incentives to optimize the rate of abandonment.
IV. OPTIMIZING ABANDONMENT
The doctrinal opacity of copyright abandonment undermines its
potential to populate the public domain and thereby further
copyright’s core objective of creating a rich cultural and informa-
tional commons.400 Instead, as the foregoing discussion has illus-
trated, the current state of abandonment generates three sets of
problems for copyright owners.
First, copyright owners who want to relinquish their rights face
significant information costs in terms of identifying a legally
effective mechanism for abandonment. The Copyright Act is
silent.401 The Copyright Office Compendium offers some guidance
but disclaims any position on the efficacy of notices of
abandonment.402 While some owners use the CC0 mechanism to
dedicate their works to the public domain, no court has yet endorsed
it. Even Creative Commons expresses some degree of uncertainty
about its effectiveness.403 Even an exhaustive review of the case law
398. See supra Part III.C.2.a.
399. See supra Part I.B.
400. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
401. See supra Part III.A.
402. See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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offers no definitive answers.404 A copyright holder who wants to
abandon her work to the public domain will engage in an expensive
and time-consuming search, just to be left without any certainty
about how to do so.
Second, some owners may be unwilling to abandon their works
due either to the costs associated with the practice or an inflated
assessment of the future value of their works.405 High-value works
are unlikely to be abandoned.406 But even owners of relatively low-
value works may be disinclined to abandon if they overestimate
their potential to generate future revenue or if incentives to
abandon are simply insufficient to overcome the inertia of automatic
protection.407
Third, many copyright holders are simply unaware that aban-
donment is an option. Indeed, given the automatic nature of protec-
tion,408 many likely are unaware that they are copyright holders in
the first place. Here the problem is not merely that the information
is hard to find,409 but that abandonment as a practice is so obscure
that rights holders do not know to consider it at all.410 In the ab-
sence of that recognition, even reluctant copyright holders are not
in a position to dedicate their works to the public. As a result, aban-
donment remains limited as a cultural practice.411 Since people tend
404. See supra Part III.C.
405. See supra Part II.B.1.
406. See supra Part II.B.1.
407. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
409. These two iterations of information costs are by no means mutually exclusive. On the
contrary, if all copyright owners somehow instantly learned of the possibility of abandoning
their works, those who found the practice appealing would still face the substantial search
costs associated with effectively relinquishing rights in their works.
410. See infra notes 472-75 and accompanying text. As the poetics of Donald Rumsfeld
would have it, it is an “[un]known unknown[ ]” whereas uncertainty about how to achieve
abandonment is a “known unknown[ ].” Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Dep’t of Def.,
D.O.D. NEWSBRIEFING (Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx
?transcriptid=2636 [https://perma.cc/73TG-JUQE].
411. See infra Part IV.C. This is not to say that the practice is unknown or never used. As
Part II illustrated, a number of even high-value works are abandoned, particularly
photographic works and software. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text. Even so,
the number of abandoned works in relation to the total universe of copyrighted works is
vanishingly small, and the practice remains nearly unheard of in other creative subcultures,
such as literary novels.
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to take their behavioral cues from the conduct of similarly situated
people,412 copyright abandonment is likely to remain rare.
In this final Part, we consider three different types of strategies
to ameliorate these problems: legal reforms designed to illuminate
a pathway to abandonment, recalibrating owners’ incentives to
abandon, and developing informal norms that promise to make
abandonment more likely.
A. Illuminating a Pathway to Abandonment
Given the common law origins of the doctrine, courts should make
efforts to clarify the standard for copyright abandonment. In
addition to clearly and consistently distinguishing abandonment
from forfeiture, waiver, and related doctrines, courts should endorse
clear written and oral statements of intent to abandon, but other-
wise interpret purported evidence of intent narrowly. In particular,
courts should disfavor efforts to establish abandonment of copyright
on the basis of the physical disposition of copies. Such a rule would
reduce confusion among both rights holders and potential users.
In light of the often slow pace of common law development,
Congress could kick-start the process of clarifying abandonment in
one of three ways. At the very least, it should amend the Copyright
Act to acknowledge (as the Patent Act does)413 that rights holders
are empowered to abandon their rights and dedicate their works to
the public.414 More usefully, Congress could define a standard and
associated mechanism for abandonment, ideally one that prioritizes
verbal indications of intent. And as discussed below, Congress could
also empower the Copyright Office to define a standard and
administer a process for recording copyright abandonments.415
412. See infra notes 472-75 and accompanying text.
413. 35 U.S.C. § 253(b) (“[A]ny patentee or applicant may disclaim or dedicate to the public
the entire term ... of the patent.”).
414. In particular, we suggest the creation of a new § 201(f) of the Copyright Act that would
entitle the owner of a copyright in a work to abandon that interest and irretrievably place the
work in the public domain.
415. Some jurisdictions provide clear statutory copyright abandonment procedures. For
example, section 21 of the India Copyright Act provides:
(1) The author of a work may relinquish all or any of the rights comprised in the
copyright in the work by giving notice in the prescribed form to [the Registrar
of Copyrights or by way of public notice] and thereupon such rights shall, subject
to the provisions of sub-section (3), cease to exist from the date of the notice.
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One long-standing risk that could be exacerbated by a clearer
process for abandonment is its potential to disrupt the Copyright
Act’s termination of transfer provisions.416 Under those provisions,
authors can rescind decades-old licenses and assignments to regain
control of their works.417 In order to discourage termination or
influence negotiations, copyright holders could threaten to abandon
the copyright in assigned works. For economically viable works, this
seems unlikely, and we know of no cases in which such strategic
abuse of abandonment has occurred. But because abandonment is
an irrevocable destruction of rights that places works in the public
domain, this risk—however remote—should be addressed. One
approach would forbid an assignee from abandoning rights to a
work within the statutory termination notice windows. This reform
would force assignees to give up some guaranteed period of exclusiv-
ity and assume the risk that no termination is forthcoming, rather
than merely retaliating once a termination notice is filed.
Another approach would recognize the termination right as a
future interest and subject the abandoning owner to liability for
waste.418 Under current law, however, that future interest does not
vest until the author serves the assignee with a termination notice.
State real property law is inconsistent on the question of whether
holders of a contingent future interest can recover for waste.419 Once
(2) On receipt of a notice under sub-section (1), the Registrar of Copyrights shall
cause it to be published in the Official Gazette and in such other manner as he
may deem fit.
(2A) The Registrar of Copyright shall, within fourteen days from the
publication of the notice in the Official Gazette, post the notice on the official
website of the Copyright Office so as to remain in the public domain for a period
of not less than three years.
(3) The relinquishment of all or any of the rights comprised in the copyright in
a work shall not affect any rights subsisting in favour of any person on the date
of the notice referred to in sub-section (1).
The Copyright Act, 1957, § 21 (footnotes omitted) (internal marks omitted) (alteration in
original), http://www.copyright.gov.in/Documents/CopyrightRules1957.pdf [https://perma.cc/
QEV4-TVZ2]. For a detailed survey of international copyright abandonment regimes, see
Guadamuz, supra note 3, at 15-23.
416. See Kreiss, supra note 123, at 111-15 (noting the potential conflict between
abandonment and termination).
417. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a)(3), 304(c).
418. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 162 (1985) (referring to the post-
termination interest as a “reversion”); Baldwin v. EMI Feist Catalog, Inc., 805 F.3d 18, 26 (2d
Cir. 2015) (calling post-termination rights a “future interest”).
419. Compare FDIC v. Mars, 821 P.2d 826, 831 (Colo. App. 1991) (“[T]he existence of a
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an author serves a notice, it seems, they would be able to seek an
injunction to prevent abandonment or recover the value of the work
from the abandoning assignee. Prior to serving notice, their position
is less certain.
At the administrative level, a number of reforms could reduce the
information costs complicating copyright abandonment. Empowered
by Congress, the Copyright Office could develop a robust adminis-
trative mechanism for evaluating, recording, and publicizing copy-
right abandonment.420 Today, notices of abandonment are filed
using the standard recordation form, just like any other transfer421
and the Office disclaims any statement as to the legal effect of such
a filing.422 Instead, the Copyright Office could promulgate a form
specifically for abandonment, one that complies with a legal stan-
dard articulated by the courts or endorsed by Congress. While the
Office’s determinations of abandonment—such as its registration
decisions—would not be dispositive, they fall squarely within the
Office’s expertise and would be entitled to judicial deference.423
Crucially, the Office should not charge a fee for filing a notice of
abandonment. Currently, the standard fee of $105 for recordation
applies.424 This creates a paradoxical scenario in which obtaining a
copyright is free, while ridding yourself of one is costly. Ideally, the
abandonment forms would be made available through a simple
online interface, allowing owners to dedicate their works easily
vested interest in the property, such as a remainder or a reversion, is a vital prerequisite to
maintenance of an action for waste.”) with Pedro v. January, 494 P.2d 868, 875 (Or. 1972)
(noting that “injunctive relief ... has been commonly granted to contingent remaindermen, but
an assessment of damages ... has been infrequent”).
420. The scope of the Copyright Office’s existing authority over such rules is uncertain. The
most relevant, explicit statutory authority the Office could claim provides that “[a]ny transfer
of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright may be recorded in the
Copyright Office if the document filed for recordation bears the actual signature of the person
who executed it, or if it is accompanied by a sworn or official certification that it is a true copy
of the original, signed document.” 17 U.S.C. § 205(a). Even if this language is sufficient to
support an effort by the Office to develop more robust procedures for abandonment, given the
importance of the question, we think Congress owes the Office some measure of additional
guidance.
421. See supra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 266.
423. See generally Perzanowski, supra note 263, at 734-36 (explaining the Copyright
Office’s expertise).
424. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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and quickly, with appropriate safeguards to prevent fraudulent
notices.425
These filings could in turn populate a searchable registry of
abandoned works. Users could locate public domain works by title,
type of work, author, former owner, date of vesting, and date of
abandonment. The Office could even make copies of abandoned
works available for download.426 Today, the Office provides no
simple way to identify works that have been abandoned,427 defeating
the purpose of abandonment from the perspective of potential users.
These proposals operate against a backdrop of considerable
private efforts to reduce the transaction costs of abandonment.
Millions of works have been distributed under the terms of CC0 and
similar instruments.428 As a further step toward facilitating
abandonment, the law—whether through Congress, courts, or the
Copyright Office—should clarify the public domain status of works
subject to such private dedication instruments.429 Although a clear,
legally recognized administrative mechanism for abandonment
would prove valuable, we do not intend for that process to function
as an exclusive means of abandonment. The choice to rely on a
private instrument, such as CC0 or an individually crafted state-
ment of abandonment, rather than a federal form, should not
425. Unlike other property records, which could be manipulated to falsely indicate
ownership of an asset, the proposed abandoned works registry does not purport to create
exclusive rights. See supra Part I.B. (discussing the differences between real property
abandonment and copyright abandonment). As a result, the incentives to falsify abandonment
records would be low. Nonetheless, we recommend requiring any such abandonment be
accompanied by a statement, under penalty of perjury, that the filer has a good faith belief
that they own the work in question.
426. User-friendly design has not been a hallmark of the Copyright Office’s internet
presence historically. But the Office has dedicated significant resources to its digital
transition in recent years. See Acting United States Register of Copyrights Written Testimony:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Legis. Branch of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 116th
Cong. 2-3, 6-9 (2019) (statement of Karyn Temple, Acting U.S. Register of Copyrights),
https://www.copyright.gov/about/budget/2020/senate-budget-testimony-fy20.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VXN8-AJ6U]. And given the Office’s status as a division of the Library of Congress,
which regularly provides public domain collections to the public, such a system should be
achievable. See, e.g., Free to Use and Reuse Sets, supra note 191.
427. See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text.
428. See supra Part II.C.
429. The Library of Congress, which houses the Copyright Office, relies on CC0 when it
chooses to make its own works available for public use. See Using Items from the Library’s
Website: Understanding Copyright, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/legal/understanding-
copyright/#online [https://perma.cc/VXN8-WA4J].
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preclude abandonment. However, we would expect over time that
either the existing CC0 instrument would be recognized as a valid
abandonment, or that it would evolve, if necessary, to satisfy what-
ever federal standard emerged. If so, owners could include the CC0
designation on abandoned works to signal their public domain sta-
tus, providing a quick way for users to determine a work’s copyright
status.430
Private organizations, such as Creative Commons or the Internet
Archive, might be better positioned to host and operate a database
of abandoned works, particularly because those entities could more
easily include works abandoned through private mechanisms in
addition to those filed with the Copyright Office.431 Ideally, at least
one complete and authoritative registry would allow the public to
search for abandoned works.
These reforms would provide a clear signal to owners about how
to abandon their copyrights, one backed by the authority of law. By
providing that information online and in easily accessible form, they
would help users access public domain resources. Relatedly, these
moves would channel abandonment to a handful of approved
mechanisms by either prompting an official and effective Copyright
Office form or endorsing existing instruments like CC0. So while the
current legal landscape consists of a confusing multiplicity of ways
to potentially relinquish one’s rights in a work of authorship, these
reforms would reduce owners’ decision costs and promote abandon-
ment generally.
B. Recalibrating Incentives
Formalizing and streamlining pathways to memorialize and pub-
licize abandonment promises to reduce confusion and transaction
430. Other scholars have argued that the Copyright Office should create a public domain
indication along the lines of the familiar “©” symbol. See Asay, supra note 179, at 801-02
(arguing for a “PD” mark to indicate public domain status). In order to make information costs
as low as possible, we think the best strategy would be to adopt currently used symbols
signaling public domain status, hence our suggestion that the Copyright Office embrace “CC0"
as a signaling device.
431. CC0 is machine readable, similar to the Creative Commons suite of licenses, facil-
itating searchability. Technical Questions, CREATIVE COMMONS (Jan. 24, 2020, 4:42 PM),
https://creativecommons.org/faq/#what-does-it-mean-that-creative-commons-licenses-are-
machine-readable [https://perma.cc/SKK3-DPUT].
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costs. This clarifies the route to abandonment for owners who are
inclined to relinquish their copyrights. It does not, however, do
anything to allay the error costs that might deter an owner from
relinquishing rights to their work when it is essentially costless to
them yet beneficial to the public.432 We thus consider two types of
strategies designed to bend the incentives of these owners toward




One approach to altering the cost calculus in favor of abandon-
ment would be to leverage the tax system to provide rights holders
marginal economic incentives to part with their works. Existing tax
law countenances donations of intellectual property, including
copyrighted works, to charitable organizations and branches of state
and federal government.433 For example, Irving Berlin donated his
interest in “God Bless America” to a trust that supports the Boy
Scouts and Girl Scouts.434 As noted above, Carol Highsmith has
donated more than fifty thousand images to the Library of Congress
on a copyright-free basis.435 The Library has also elected to make
other works in its collections available for unrestricted public use.436
But nothing requires that works donated to the Library of Congress,
432. See supra Part II.B.1.
433. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (defining “charitable contribution” to include a gift to “[a] State,
a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or the
United States or the District of Columbia, but only if the contribution or gift is made for
exclusively public purposes”).
434. William Glaberson, Irving Berlin Gave the Scouts a Gift of Song, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14,
2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/14/us/irving-berlin-gave-the-scouts-a-gift-of-song.
html [https://perma.cc/NND5-X3FN].
435. First Amended Complaint, supra note 105, ¶¶ 5-6; Highsmith (Carol M.) Archive,
LIBR. OF CONG., http://www.loc.gov/pictures/search/?st=grid&co=highsm [https://perma.
cc/VH3T-6J39]. Highsmith’s initial gift to the Library included a number of transparencies,
negatives, and prints, but in the same document she “dedicate[d] to the public all rights,
including copyrights, throughout the world ... in this collection.” First Amended Complaint,
supra note 105, Ex. I, at 1.
436. See supra note 191.
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or any other government entity, be dedicated to the public do-
main.437
Likewise, the donation of works to a nonprofit organization need
not result in abandonment. Those contributions are merely assign-
ments—transfers of copyright ownership from one party to an-
other.438 In both cases, abandonment would require some further
evidence of an intent to eliminate the copyright, either by the donor
at the time of transfer or by the donee organization after the fact.439
Whether donated to the Library of Congress, an existing organiza-
tion like Creative Commons or the Internet Archive, or to a newly
formed nonprofit committed to dedicating works to the public do-
main, such works could qualify as charitable contributions.440
The current tax treatment of copyrighted works provides little
incentive for owners to part with them. The Internal Revenue Code
distinguishes between two types of copyrighted works for the pur-
poses of charitable deductions: those donated by their creators and
those donated by noncreators. Since 1969, if the creator of a work
donates it, they are not entitled to deduct its fair market value but
only out-of-pocket expenses associated with the work that have not
been previously deducted.441 In many cases, that translates to no
deduction whatsoever.442 In contrast, works donated by someone
other than their creators were deductible historically at fair mar-
ket value.443 But in 2004, Congress tightened the rules for donations
of intellectual property amid concerns about patent valuation
437. The government can own copyrights assigned by nongovernmental authors. 17 U.S.C.
§ 105.
438. See PUB.COUNS.L.CTR., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING BASICS FOR NONPROFITS,
7 (2016), http://www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/0806.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZGH-
J5SC] (describing the difference between a license and assignment); supra notes 55-56 and
accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
440. Martin Skladany has offered a similar proposal to encourage the dissemination of
newly designated public domain works. MARTIN SKLADANY, BIG COPYRIGHT VERSUS THE
PEOPLE: HOW MAJOR CONTENT PROVIDERS ARE DESTROYING CREATIVITY AND HOW TO STOP
THEM 115-16 (2018) (ebook).
441. Charitable contributions of creators are governed by the general rule in 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(e)(1)(A). Income from their sale is not considered a capital asset, so the value is reduced
by any gain from a hypothetical sale. Id. § 1221(a)(3); see also Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey
A. Maine, Giving Intellectual Property, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1721, 1750 n.125 (2006).
442. See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 441, at 1749-50 n.125, 1751.
443. Id. at 1751.
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abuses.444 Under the new rules, the donor’s tax deduction is the
lesser of the asset’s fair market value or its tax basis.445 Typically,
that tax basis is very small, and again, in many cases it is zero.446
More generous deductibility rules could yield an increase in
abandonment. But it may sacrifice significant federal revenue in
the process. The IRS discourages large-scale fraud by requiring a
qualified appraisal for any charitable deductions over $5,000.447
But $1,000 or $100 deductions for abandoned photos, emails, and
mediocre poetry could add up. Conversely, there is a risk that given
the recent increase in the standard deduction,448 itemizing low-
dollar-value donations of works might insufficiently incentivize
individual copyright holders. Finally, attaching a monetary benefit
to an otherwise altruistic act, like donating a work to the public,
may actually dissuade would-be abandoners by framing the act in
terms of financial self-interest rather than concern for others.449
b. Cash Incentives
A simpler approach would offer copyright holders modest cash
payments to abandon. If, rather than charging rights holders
$105 to file a notice of abandonment,450 the Copyright Office gave
444. See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117
Stat. 752; 149 CONG. REC. S11,804 (daily ed. May 15, 2003) (statement of Sen. Grassley)
(noting “widespread abuse involving donations of patents and similar property”).
445. Nguyen & Maine, supra note 441, at 1746.
446. Id. at 1746-47. Deductions arising from such donations must be reduced by any long-
term capital gains. 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(e)(1)(A), (B)(iii). To partially address the disincentive that
these harsher rules create, Congress provided for future deductions, over a twelve-year phase-
out period, based on any revenue derived by the donee from the gift. See id. §§ 170(m)(7),
(10)(C); see also Nguyen & Maine, supra note 441, at 1746-47. This provision does little to
encourage copyright abandonment.
447. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N 561, DETERMINING THE VALUE OF DONATED
PROPERTY 9 (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p561.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HMX-UZYG].
In addition, for items valued at $50,000 or more, the IRS Art Advisory Panel provides an
additional layer of scrutiny. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL 4.48.2.2,
https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-048-002 [https://perma.cc/8QK6-P2TP].
448. TAX POL’Y CTR., BRIEFING BOOK 138 (2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/
default/files/briefing-book/bb_full_2018_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZNB-KSRU].
449. See Fagundes, supra note 242, at 1395-98 (citing literature showing that self-interest
and altruism tend to compete directly with each other, and that the former tends to
predominate).
450. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 269; see supra text accompanying note 424.
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abandoning rights holders ten dollars per work, we would expect to
see a considerable increase in abandonment.
This approach faces its own set of challenges. First, calibrating
payments to induce the optimal levels of abandonment would be no
easy task. A payment of $1,000 per work would undoubtedly enrich
the public domain but may lead many songwriters or photograph-
ers to abandon works with considerable commercial potential.
Second, cash payments increase the risk of gaming the system. Even
at ten dollars each, a dedicated, if unskilled, poet could make a tidy
sum producing soon-to-be abandoned works. An annual or lifetime
cap on payments could mitigate some of that risk. More generally,
a cash-based abandonment incentive could prove massively ex-
pensive given the number of unwanted copyrighted works produced
each year. Justifying that expense in light of other demands on the
federal budget would be difficult.
Of course, there is nothing preventing a private entity from
investing its resources in enriching the public domain. The Arcadia
Fund, for example, has made an $850,000 grant to MIT Press to
support open-access monographs.451 Perhaps public domain dedi-
cation would prove an even more attractive investment. Even for-
profit corporations may have some incentive to foot the bill for
abandonment, although they are more likely to prefer exclusive
licenses to abandonment.
c. Golden Swan Insurance
In Part II, we discussed “golden swans”—works that generate
substantial and unexpected value late in the copyright term—and
authors’ fears of parting with such works in light of the costlessness
of owning a copyright.452 The golden swan problem is a matter of
risk assessment clouded by optimism bias.453 Insurance may furnish
a solution.
451. The MIT Press Receives a Generous Grant from the Arcadia Fund to Develop and Pilot
a Sustainable Framework for Open Access Monographs, MIT PRESS (Oct. 3, 2019), https://
mitpress.mit.edu/blog/mit-press-receives-generous-grant-arcadia-fund-develop-and-pilot-
sustainable-framework-open [https://perma.cc/Z79K-J67G].
452. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
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Consider a system that promised any owner who abandoned their
work compensation if that work earned significant revenue either
through being republished or incorporated into a derivative work.
Such a system should be funded and managed by a federal agency,
such as the Copyright Office, because private funding would prove
infeasible.454 Given that the public receives the benefit of abandon-
ment,455 public funding makes some measure of sense even if
securing significant federal dollars for golden swan insurance is
unlikely.
Aside from that budgetary hurdle, the chief practical challenges
of such a system would be accounting for the profit that a given
work earns and administering payouts. One partial solution would
be to keep the compensation structure as simple as possible. The
policy could give donors of abandoned works a set rate (for example
$10,000) if their abandoned work earns gross revenue456 in excess of
some threshold (for example $100,000).457 This may undercompen-
sate owners whose works become true blockbusters. Such outcomes
are vanishingly rare.458 The aim of the policy is less to ensure full
compensation and more to assuage owners’ hesitance to abandon a
potential golden swan. The mere possibility of compensation may
suffice to overcome owners’ optimism bias.459
454. See infra note 459; cf. Nancy Watkins & David D. Evans, U.S. Private Flood
Insurance: The Journey to Build a New Market, INS.J. (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.insurance
journal.com/news/national/2019/09/27/541314.htm [https://perma.cc/X2LF-5A5D] (discussing
the difficulty of establishing and maintaining private flood insurance due to high operating
costs).
455. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting that abandoned works are
surrendered to the public domain).
456. Abandoned works are in the public domain, but they may still be used to create
revenue, such as by creating valuable derivative works. Heald, Property Rights, supra note
133, at 1052 n.70.
457. Admittedly, determining the contribution of a particular work to revenues generated
by a derivative work presents a more complex challenge. Cf. Buccafusco & Heald, supra note
145, at 12-17, 29-35 (discussing theories explaining how derivative works impact the value
of a work in the public domain).
458. See Buccafusco & Sprigman, supra note 116, at 32-33.
459. A rough analogy is FEMA flood insurance. The federal government offers residents
of homes in designated high-risk areas low-cost insurance to compensate them for damage in
the event of a flood. Bonnie Kristian, The Perverse Incentives of the National Flood Insurance
Program, THE WEEK (Aug. 29, 2017), https://theweek.com/articles/721185/perverse-incentives-
national-flood-insurance-program [https://perma.cc/DEC2-2RZK]. The policies do not promise
full compensation, but only reimbursement up to a cap well below the property’s value. See
id. They thus function as an enticement to offset concerns about possible low-probability,
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2. Sticks
If retaining low-value copyrights is socially harmful, the copyright
system could impose costs on rights holders to encourage abandon-
ment. Most forms of intellectual property require some payment or
action in order to maintain rights. The failure to pay maintenance
fees, ranging as high as $7,400, results in the loss of patent rights.460
Trademark owners must use their marks in commerce and renew
their registrations.461 Trade secret owners must make reason-
able—and often costly—efforts to maintain their secrets.462
But copyright has parted from its cognate fields. Copyright
holders bear no costs to maintain ownership.463 In large part, this
reflects compliance with international obligations. The Berne
Convention requires that “[t]he enjoyment and exercise” of copy-
rights “shall not be subject to any formality.”464 Requiring that
authors take any affirmative action to renew their copyrights
represents an archetypal violation of Berne.465
Scholars have offered a number of proposals to address the
downsides of formality-free copyright.466 Lawrence Lessig proposed
the Public Domain Enhancement Act, which would have required
owners to pay a one dollar fee fifty years after a work’s first
high-impact risks. See id. But unlike FEMA flood insurance, golden swan policies would have
vanishingly small payout risks. And the behavior they incentivize is socially beneficial
(dedicating works to the public domain) as opposed to socially harmful (building homes likely
to contribute to increased environmental damage). Compare note 57 and accompanying text,
with id.
460. 35 U.S.C. § 42(b); USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 1, 2020),
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-sched
ule#Patent%20Maintenance%20Fee [https://perma.cc/6U4F-LDPG].
461. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a)(3)(C), (d); Overview of Trademark Fees, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. (Feb. 15, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/fees-payment-information/
overview-trademark-fees [https://perma.cc/HA7Z-D455].
462. See Gavin C. Reid, Nicola Searle & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What’s It Worth to Keep
a Secret?, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 116, 124-25 (2015); Neil Wilkof, The Cost of Trade Secrets:
Don’t Overlook the Psychological Price Being Paid, J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 715, 715
(2017).
463. See Fees, supra note 269.
464. Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic and Literary Works art. 5(2), July 14,
1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, 233 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
465. See id.
466. See, e.g., Sprigman, supra note 161, at 545-67 (outlining policy options to counter
challenges arising in the wake of eradication of copyright formalities).
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publication, and again every ten years until expiration.467 In a
different vein, Richard Posner and William Landes have advocated
for indefinite copyrights, subject to an ongoing obligation to
renew.468 Although these proposals reinstate formal requirements
that could shift the calculus in favor of abandonment, they would
also increase the rate of forfeiture through unintentional failures to
comply.
To remain compliant with the Berne Convention and focus
exclusively on abandonment, consider this alternative: owners of
registered works would owe a tax of $100 per year on each work
starting in the fifteenth year of the copyright term. This tax would
not be paired with automatic forfeiture of copyright. It would be
penalized instead by the standard IRS rules for nonpayment of
taxes.469 In this case, Berne presents no obstacle because enjoyment
and exercise of the copyright is not contingent on payment of a fee
or compliance with a formality.470
This approach obviously represents a much lighter-touch
intervention than the other sticks discussed above. Some owners of
registered works—especially high-value works that are earning
467. H.R. 2408, 109th Cong. § 306 (2005); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
248-49 (2004) (eBook). The PDEA was twice proposed in the U.S. House of Representatives;
it died in committee both times. Public Domain Enhancement Act, H.R. 2601, 108th Cong.
(2003); Pamela Samuelson, Notice Failures Arising from Copyright Duration Rules, 96 B.U.
L. REV. 667, 689 n.166 (2016); H.R. 2408-Public Domain Enhancement Act, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/109th-congress/house-bill/2408/all-actions?KWICView=false
[https://perma.cc/7P9Z-CVNF]; H.R. 2601-Public Domain Enhancement Act, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/house-bill/2601/all-actions?q=%7B%22
search%22%3A%22%5C%22Public+Domain+Enhancement+Act%5C%22%22%7D [https://
perma.cc/CE2J-AVE3]. The proposal attempted to avoid the Berne problem by limiting its
application to works first published in the United States. See H.R. 2408, § 306. This would
reduce the effective scope of the legislation but would save it from violating Berne, which
adopts a national treatment principle: nations may disadvantage their own copyrights, though
they cannot do so to foreign ones. Berne Convention, supra note 464, art. 5.
468. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.CHI.
L.REV. 471, 517-18 (2003) [hereinafter Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable]. The Landes
and Posner proposal flies in the face of the Constitution’s mandate that Congress may create
copyrights only for “limited [t]imes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Posner and Landes foresaw
this objection and argued that the constitutional meaning of “limited [t]imes” is unclear and
that any renewal short of infinity is limited. Landes & Posner, Indefinitely Renewable, supra,
at 472-73.
469. See Topic No. 653 IRS Notices and Bills, Penalties, and Interest Charges, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc653 [https://perma.cc/C5BQ-6JDF].
470. See Berne Convention, supra note 464, art. 5.
566 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:487
substantial revenue—will find $100 per year a fully justified cost in
relation to their royalty income. Wealthy owners may regard the
amount as trivial regardless of the value of their work. For authors
of works that are no longer producing income, it will force them to
consider abandonment. In this sense, it operates as a “nudge” in the
now-familiar phrasing of Sunstein and Thaler.471 This tax proposal
does not coerce, and it will not affect the conduct of most owners. At
the margins, it will encourage owners to weigh abandonment as an
option.
C. Availability and Abandonment as a Social Practice
Optimizing abandonment also requires thinking about it not only
as a doctrine but also as a social practice. One explanation for the
rarity of abandonment is its absence from the copyright lexicon.472
Copyrights owners know that they may transfer, license, and
sublicense their works, or hang onto them for life and devise them
as part of their estate.473 The Copyright Act contains a detailed
statutory scheme governing all these options, but nowhere does it
use the term “abandonment.”474 Scholarly texts that otherwise
exhaustively canvass the entirety of copyright pay scant attention
to abandonment, often referring briefly to the doctrine only as a
defense to infringement, not as an affirmative strategy owners may
wish to undertake.475 A major part of the challenge, then, is
centering abandonment as a practice that owners may choose to
pursue.
471. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6-8 (rev. ed. 2009) (ebook).
472. Two types of works—software and photography—are abandoned with higher
frequency than others. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., supra note 208, at 11; supra notes 237-40
and accompanying text. We believe this behavior suggests a desire for abandonment that
could be better facilitated by law reform. It also suggests the potential for emergent trends
in favor of abandonment in other creative communities, among authors and filmmakers for
example, in which the practice is far less prevalent. See Matthew W. Tureztky, Applying
Copyright Abandonment in the Digital Age, 19 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. ¶¶ 2-4 (2010);
Filmmakers Talk About Copyright, COPYRIGHT USER, https://www.copyrightuser.org/create/
creators-discuss/filmmaker/ [https://perma.cc/X96F-25AM].
473. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 201-205.
474. Id. (defining ownership, outlining scheme for transfer and termination of transfer, and
establishing means to record copyright-related transactions).
475. See, e.g., Kreiss, supra note 123, at 92.
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In short, abandonment has an availability problem. Among the
major cognitive biases that behavioralists have shown to distort our
thinking is availability.476 When a phenomenon is especially salient,
we are inclined to overestimate its likelihood.477 For example, people
tend to avoid the beach after highly publicized shark attacks, even
though the likelihood of shark attacks is no greater due to a single
well-publicized incident.478 By the same token, where a given phe-
nomenon is not immediately familiar, people may wrongly assume
that it is generally unavailable.479 For example, if you live in a tech-
savvy city like San Francisco, you are unlikely to know anyone who
lacks an internet connection and are thus much more likely to
overstate the national prevalence of internet connectivity.480 For
similar reasons, copyright holders may fail to abandon their copy-
rights, even when doing so suits their needs, simply because aban-
donment’s obscurity renders it unavailable as a social practice.
Neither courts, nor Congress, nor the Copyright Office have the
power to immediately render abandonment salient in the minds of
owners. That said, the strategies we suggest in this Part may help
to ameliorate abandonment’s availability problem. Simply provid-
ing a visible pathway to abandoning works will serve to highlight
the practice as one that owners may choose, alongside transfer and
licensing.481 This pathway may serve as a focal point around which
the social practice of abandonment may coalesce.482 As a number of
476. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Introduction to JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
477. Id. (outlining the nature of the availability heuristic).
478. Why We Tend to Think that Things that Happened Recently Are More Likely to Happen
Again, DECISION LAB, https://thedecisionlab.com/biases/availability-heuristic/ [https://perma.
cc/K9GN-FEWW]. This is an example of what Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein have termed
an “availability error”: reasoning that is mistaken because it overemphasizes readily available
information and discounts that which is not equally available. See Timur Kuran & Cass
Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999).
479. Jamie Madigan, The Availability Heuristic Is Always On, PSYCH. TODAY (Apr. 15,
2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/mind-games/201304/the-availability-heuris
tic-is-always [https://perma.cc/HM44-YKPT].
480. See id. (discussing this example).
481. Cf. Richard H. Thaler, Cass R. Sunstein & John P. Balz, Choice Architecture 14-15
(Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1583509 [https://perma.cc/DWN4-QAVQ] (showing that visible phenomena are more available
and thus more likely to affect decisions).
482. The seminal work on how behavior coalesces around focal points is THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-59 (1980) (ebook). Schelling showed that conduct
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studies have shown, behaviors are much more likely to emerge
when there is some pattern or framework to guide and encourage
their development. Independently, incentivizing abandonment,
either via carrot or stick, could send a message about the desirabil-
ity of abandonment. The work of private organizations like Creative
Commons has been, and will continue to be, crucially important in
increasing the availability and ease of abandonment, and in cre-
ating a culture in which it is celebrated.483 Together, these twin
forces could help to bring abandonment out of the shadows and
make it an available, and likely more generally used, social practice
for copyright owners.
CONCLUSION
One might look at the near absence of scholarly attention to copy-
right abandonment as an indication that the doctrine is of little
consequence.484 This Article has dispelled that misapprehension.
By situating copyright abandonment within the broader resurgence
of interest in abandonment generally, we have offered a competing
theory of abandonment as a relinquishment of rights that rec-
onciles apparent contradictions within the unilateral transfer ap-
proach. We have also highlighted the significant stakes of the
doctrine, for individual authors and the public writ large, by ex-
ploring both the economic calculus and the counterintuitive reality
of copyright abandonment. As our detailed canvassing of the pos-
itive law of copyright abandonment reveals, the doctrine is fractured
and the mechanism for effective abandonment remains uncertain.485
Optimizing abandonment demands, at the very least, clear and
reliable legal and administrative pathways. Beyond that, encour-
aging prosocial abandonment of copyright may require shifting
rights holder incentives and, more promisingly, the development
naturally coalesces around locations and behaviors that are socially salient, famously
illustrated by his experiment in which New Yorkers successfully met each other even without
a given date or time because they all familiarly assumed to do so at noon at Grand Central
Station. Id. at 55-56.
483. See supra notes 224-35 and accompanying text.
484. See supra note 475 and accompanying text.
485. See supra Part III.
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of social practices that value the public domain and copyright’s
constitutional aspirations.
